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LAWYERS FOR LEGAL GHOSTS: THE LEGALITY AND 
ETHICS OF REPRESENTING PERSONS SUBJECT TO 
GUARDIANSHIP 
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Abstract: A person subject to guardianship has been judicially determined to lack legal 
capacity. Stripped of legal personhood, the individual becomes a ward of the state and his or 
her decisions are delegated to a guardian. If the guardian abuses that power or the 
guardianship has been wrongly imposed—as research suggests is not infrequently the case—
the person subject to guardianship may rightly wish to mount a legal challenge. However, 
effectively doing so requires the assistance of an attorney, and persons subject to 
guardianship typically have not only been declared by a court to be incapable of directing 
their own affairs but have been stripped of the capacity to contract. As a result, those who 
wish to challenge the terms and conditions of their guardianship, or even merely to exercise 
unrelated retained rights, can be stymied because attorneys are unwilling to accept 
representation for fear that it is unlawful or unethical. Drawing on constitutional law, as well 
as the law of agency and contract, this Article shows why such representations are, contrary 
to the assumptions of many attorneys, not merely legally permissible but essential to protect 
fundamental constitutional rights. It then explores the professional rules governing attorney 
conduct in order to show how attorneys may ethically represent persons subject to 
guardianship. Finally, it proposes a modest change to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct to clarify attorneys’ duties in this context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Jenny Hatch, a 28-year-old woman with Down syndrome, 
was placed in a group home by her parents, who had been appointed as 
her guardians. Despondent about the restrictive placement and the loss 
of her independent lifestyle, and devastated that she was no longer able 
to work her much-loved job at a local thrift store, Jenny engaged an 
attorney to challenge both the existence of the guardianship and the 
appointment of her parents as guardians.
1
 The following year, she 
prevailed. In a landmark decision, a Virginia court removed her parents 
as guardians, appointed Jenny’s close friends in their place, and held that 
the guardianship itself would terminate after a year.
2
 A year later, Jenny 
was thus legally reincarnated, restored from being a ward of the state—a 
condition often referred to as a legal death
3—to full legal personhood. 
                                                     
1. Consistent with how she refers to herself and how she is referred to by her advocacy team, we 
refer to Jenny by her chosen first name. Her full legal name is Margaret Jean Hatch. 
2. Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P-03, slip op. at 5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://jennyhatchjusticeproject.org/docs/justice_for_jenny_trial/jhjp_trial_final_order.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VA2E-J48F]. 
3. See, e.g., In re Interdiction of Parnell, 129 So. 3d 690, 692 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (“Interdiction is 
a harsh remedy. A judgment of interdiction amounts to civil death . . . .” (quoting Interdiction of 
Haggerty, 519 So. 2d 868, 869 (La. Ct. App. 1988))); Patricia M. Cavey, Realizing the Right to 
Counsel in Guardianship: Dispelling Guardianship Myths, 2 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 26, 28 
(2000) (describing guardianship as a “legal death”); Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians 
and Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and 
the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2013) (describing guardianship 
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Jenny’s story captured national attention4 in large part because it is so 
unusual. Few persons subject to guardianship
5
 are able to change the 
terms and conditions of their guardianships, let alone regain legal 
capacity after a court has determined that they lack capacity to make 
decisions for themselves.
6
 Jenny was able to do both. 
A key factor in this success was that Jenny had access to legal 
representation.
7
 Unfortunately, many people in Jenny’s position do not.8 
A major factor contributing to this lack of access is that attorneys are 
unsure whether they may legally and ethically represent a person subject 
to guardianship.
9
 
Attorney reluctance to undertake such representation is 
                                                     
as a “civil death”). 
4. See, e.g., Don Dahler, Woman with Down Syndrome Becomes Icon for Disabled, CBS NEWS 
(Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/woman-with-down-syndrome-becomes-icon-for-
disabled [https://perma.cc/S5FR-RXW8]; Natalie DiBlasio, Judge: Woman with Down Syndrome 
Can Live with Friends, USA TODAY (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2013/08/03/down-syndrome-custody/2614587 [https://perma.cc/3PEA-6Q8N]; Theresa Vargas, 
Woman with Down Syndrome Prevails over Parents in Guardianship Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/woman-with-down-syndrome-prevails-over-parents-
in-guardianship-case/2013/08/02/4aec4692-fae3-11e2-9bde-7ddaa186b751_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/48HS-VA7R]. 
5. We use the term “person subject to guardianship” in lieu of the traditional legal term “ward,” 
which has been criticized as dehumanizing the individual and carrying an unnecessary connotation 
of dependency. By doing so, however, we do not mean to mask the very real power inequalities that 
exist among parties in the guardianship system. We have settled on the somewhat cumbersome term 
“persons subject to guardianship” in an attempt to stay focused on the personhood of individuals 
while also situating them in the guardianship structure. At times, however, we use the descriptor 
“ward” when discussing statutes or court opinions that employ that term. 
6. See Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights in the Termination of Adult Guardianship, 23 ELDER 
L.J. 83, 83 (2015) (finding that petitions for restoration of rights are uncommon). 
7. Ms. Hatch was represented by attorney Jonathan Martinis, then with the Quality Trust for 
Individuals with Disabilities, a nonprofit advocacy organization. See Respondent’s Motion for 
Access to Her Counsel and Supplement to Motion for a Continuance at 7, Ross, slip op.  
8. See Cassidy, supra note 6, at 102, 121 (discussing attorneys’ reluctance to represent persons 
seeking to challenge their guardianship, and concluding that “one of the greatest barriers to 
restoration is the ability of the protected individual to hire counsel”).  
9. Over the course of the past several years, with a particular spike in interest in May 2015, the 
American Bar Association’s Elderbar listserv has featured a series of postings expressing concern 
about the legal and ethical status of representing persons subject to guardianship. See, e.g., Posting 
of Erica Wood, erica.wood@americanbar.org, to elderbar@mailamericanbar.org (May 7, 2015, 5:25 
PM) (on file with authors) (curating a series of posts on this topic). Partially in response to this 
concern, the authors presented a continuing legal education training on this topic to a sizeable 
audience of public interest attorneys at the 2014 National Aging and Law Conference. Even among 
this highly progressive, predominately legal aid-affiliated audience, concerns about the legal 
permissibility—and ethical ramifications—of such representation were common. See also Cassidy, 
supra note 6, at 102 (discussing the reasons why attorneys are reluctant to represent persons subject 
to guardianship seeking restoration of rights). 
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understandable. A person subject to guardianship has, by definition, 
been judicially determined to lack legal capacity and his or her decisions 
have been delegated to a third party. This third party is typically called a 
“guardian” but sometimes referred to as a “conservator.”10 Through this 
process, the person has not only been declared by a court to be incapable 
of directing his or her own affairs but has typically been stripped of the 
capacity to enter into a legally binding contract. Both may appear to be 
insurmountable barriers. Attorneys generally can only represent clients 
who have the capacity to enter into a contract to hire the attorney and the 
capacity to direct the attorney during the course of the representation. 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, probate courts have taken the position 
that they can prevent a lawyer from representing a person subject to 
guardianship who wishes to challenge the guardianship.
11
 
A lack of clear ethical guidance for attorneys further contributes to 
the current confusion as to the legal permissibility and ethics of 
representing a person subject to guardianship. Although much has been 
written about an attorney’s role and ethical obligations when 
representing a client with questionable cognitive capacity,
12
 there is 
                                                     
10. Most states use the term “guardianship” to refer to the process by which a surrogate is 
appointed to make personal and health care decisions for an incapacitated person. Many states also 
use the term “guardianship” to refer to the process by which a surrogate is appointed to make 
financial decisions for a person who has been adjudicated to lack capacity to make such decisions, 
and the corresponding term “guardian” to refer to the resulting surrogate. In other states, by 
contrast, the term “conservatorship” is instead used to refer to the process by which a surrogate is 
appointed to make financial decisions and the corresponding term “conservator” to refer to the 
resulting surrogate. However, there are a few states that use the term “conservator” to refer to 
someone appointed to make both financial and personal decisions, and Louisiana uses the term 
interdiction. See Nina A. Kohn, Matched Preferences and Values: A New Approach to Selecting 
Legal Surrogates, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 399, 402–03 (2015). In this Article, we choose to use the 
term “guardianship” for simplicity to cover appointments over both the person and property. 
11. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Zaltman, 843 N.E.2d 663, 664 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) 
(requiring an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a woman had capacity to retain counsel to 
challenge the guardianship before permitting her to engage such counsel). Notably, attorney 
participants in the American Bar Association’s “Elderbar” listserv have documented a series of such 
refusals in their correspondence to one another. See, e.g., Posting of Erica Wood, supra note 9 
(curating posts).  
12. See Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited 
Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 331 (2011) 
(discussing practical and ethical issues when defending a client against a guardianship petition); 
Vicki Gottlich, Zealous Advocacy for the Defendant in Adult Guardianship Cases, 29 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 879 (1996) (describing the role of attorneys for allegedly incapacitated 
individuals as zealous advocates); David A. Green, “I’m Ok—You’re Ok”: Educating Lawyers to 
“Maintain a Normal Client-Lawyer Relationship” with a Client with a Mental Disability, 28 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 65 (2004) (arguing in favor of lawyer education and guidance to improve 
representation of persons with mental disabilities); Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with 
Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609 (1989–1990) 
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virtually no legal or social science literature on representing a client who 
has been judicially determined to lack legal capacity and whose rights 
have been delegated to a guardian.
13
 Furthermore, as we show in this 
Article, existing ethical rules are confusing and arguably internally 
inconsistent, secondary sources of ethical guidance provide little 
additional assistance, and the courts have yet to articulate a clear 
framework for guiding such representations. 
This lack of guidance available to attorneys is unfortunate, 
particularly because the questions of whether a person who has been 
adjudicated incapacitated may retain an attorney and the ethical duties of 
attorneys who are retained are of increasing importance within the legal 
community. One reason is that the aging of the population means the 
number of persons potentially subject to guardianship is likely 
increasing.
14
 Perhaps more importantly, there is a growing recognition 
                                                     
(analyzing power dynamics in the attorney-client relationship); Maria M. das Neves, Project: Legal 
Ethics and the Elderly: The Role of Counsel in Guardianship Proceedings of the Elderly, 4 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 855 (1991) (advocating mandatory legal representation for defendants in pre-
appointment guardianship proceedings); Joan L. O’Sullivan, Role of the Attorney for the Alleged 
Incapacitated Person, 31 STETSON L. REV. 687 (2002) (arguing attorneys should advocate 
strenuously for clients’ preferences to protect due process rights of allegedly incapacitated persons); 
Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model Rules Say and 
Don’t Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (1998) (criticizing the American Bar Association’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct for failing to address the challenge of establishing an attorney-client 
relationship); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the 
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515 (discussing options available when a client 
may lack capacity to give informed consent). 
13. To the extent that the legal literature has explored the lawyer’s ethical obligations with regard 
to persons subject to guardianship, the focus has been on attorneys’ obligations to a person subject 
to guardianship when the attorney represents the guardian. In a classic article on representing 
fiduciaries, Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. explored the obligation of a lawyer who represents a guardian to a 
person subject to guardianship to craft an argument that the traditional concept of the attorney-client 
relationship is inadequate and to advocate for a modulated approach that recognizes the commonly 
shared interests of the parties, absent direct conflict. Hazard’s analysis stops short of directly 
exploring the lawyer’s obligation when representing the person subject to guardianship. See 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987); Kennedy Lee, Representing the Fiduciary: To Whom Does the Attorney 
Owe Duties?, 37 ACTEC L.J. 469 (2011) (considering the attorney’s duty to a person subject to 
guardianship when representing a guardian). 
14. Although precise figures are unknown, estimates suggest that about 1.5 million adults are 
subject to guardianships in the United States. See BRENDA K. UEKERT & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, 
ADULT GUARDIANSHIPS: A “BEST GUESS” NATIONAL ESTIMATE AND THE MOMENTUM FOR 
REFORM (2011), http://www.guardianship.org/reports/Uekert_Van_Duizend_Adult_ 
Guardianships.pdf [https://perma.cc/A88D-4LPE]. Many of these are older persons who suffer from 
Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of dementia. The number of persons subject to guardianship 
may grow as the number of persons with such conditions increases. See Alzheimer’s Ass’n, 2014 
Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 10 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 2, 22 tbl.2 (2014) 
(projecting that by 2025 the number of older individuals over age sixty-five in the United States 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease will reach more than seven million, a forty percent increase 
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that many guardianships have been wrongly imposed or are overbroad.
15
 
This recognition, encouraged in part by the United Nation’s adoption of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),
16
 has 
led to increased interest from the disability rights community in restoring 
the rights of persons subject to guardianship by challenging judicial 
determinations of incapacity.
17
 
This Article seeks to provide, for the first time, a comprehensive 
account of the legal status of attorney representation of persons subject 
to guardianship and to distill a legal framework for such representations. 
To do so, it draws upon constitutional law, agency law, contract law, and 
the law and professional rules governing attorneys to answer two critical 
questions. First, can an adult subject to guardianship engage in an 
attorney-client relationship despite the declaration of legal incapacity?
18
 
Second, if so, what is the attorney’s role and ethical obligation when 
representing a person subject to guardianship? 
The Article proceeds in four primary parts. Part I provides an 
overview of guardianship and describes the circumstances under which a 
lawyer might be called on to represent a person subject to guardianship. 
Part II considers the legal permissibility of attorney representation of 
persons subject to guardianship from the perspective of common law, 
constitutional law, and statutory law. Part III considers the role and 
ethical standards of attorneys representing persons subject to 
guardianship. Finally, Part IV suggests how existing ethical rules could 
be reformed to provide better and more appropriate guidance to 
attorneys who undertake representation of persons subject to 
guardianship. 
                                                     
over 2014 figures). 
15. See Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 
117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013) (discussing the overuse of guardianship, the overbreadth of 
guardianship orders, and the increasingly common critiques of guardianship). 
16. In particular, the language of Article 12 of the CRPD has prompted some to rethink the 
appropriateness of guardianship and its uses. See generally Perlin, supra note 3; Kristin Booth Glen, 
Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2012) (describing the CRPD approach as shifting the established 
guardianship paradigm, and thus having the potential to change guardianship law or perhaps even 
lead to the abolition of guardianship).  
17. See, e.g., JENNY HATCH JUST. PROJECT, http://www.jennyhatchjusticeproject.org 
[https://perma.cc/Y338-Z7F8] (last visited July 21, 2015); THE ARC, POSITION STATEMENT: 
ADVOCACY (2010), http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3637 [https://perma.cc/FL9Q-5D59]. 
18. The questions of how a minor subject to guardianship may engage an attorney and the proper 
role of that attorney are also important topics, but are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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I. CONTEXTS OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
Guardianship is the judicial process through which a court determines 
whether an allegedly incapacitated person is unable to make decisions 
for him or herself. To be placed under a guardianship, an individual must 
be found by a judge or jury to meet the criteria for legal incapacity.
19
 
Jurisdictions differ in how they define “incapacity” in the guardianship 
context, but the modern trend is to use a functional definition that 
focuses on what the individual is able to do, not simply his or her 
medical diagnosis.
20
 As a practical matter, those found to be 
incapacitated for the purpose of guardianship are a diverse group. On 
one extreme are individuals in a vegetative state or coma. On the other 
end of the spectrum are those who are highly functional, but whose 
conditions impair judgment, leading to potentially dangerous decision-
making or rendering them vulnerable to exploitation.
21
 
If a person is declared incapacitated in a guardianship proceeding, a 
guardian can be appointed to manage all or some of the person’s affairs. 
If the guardian is appointed over all decisions, the guardianship is called 
“plenary,” “full,” or “general,” and the person subject to guardianship 
can lose the right to independently make even the most fundamental 
choices such as where to live, how to spend financial resources, or 
whether to consent to medical treatment. These decisions become the 
prerogative of the guardian, subject to the supervision of the court. In 
other cases, the guardianship is “limited” and the guardian is appointed 
only to manage a subset of the person’s affairs. An individual under a 
limited guardianship retains all rights that are not expressly restricted by 
the guardianship order.
22
 
An individual who has been placed under guardianship may seek 
attorney representation for a variety of reasons. Often the legal 
assistance is for a matter related to the guardianship. For example, the 
                                                     
19. The American Bar Association Commission on Law and Aging has helpfully compiled all 
fifty states’ standards for determining incapacity. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, CAPACITY 
DEFINITION & INITIATION OF GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS (2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/CHARTCapacityandInitiati
on.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRQ4-B8Z9]. Persons subject to guardianship who would 
seek representation would generally be expected to be those who may well have significant 
decision-making challenges but who are still able to form and articulate personal preferences and 
goals. 
20. See NINA A. KOHN, ELDER LAW: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROBLEMS 152 (2014). 
21. Notably, it is at this end of the spectrum that judges are most likely to erroneously impose 
guardianship due to misjudgment of functional capacity. 
22. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and the Use of Limited 
Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 741–42 (2002) (defining limited guardianship). 
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person subject to guardianship may consult with an attorney to 
understand the scope and effects of the guardianship, what rights have 
been retained, or the obligations and prerogatives of the guardian. The 
person may wish to challenge the acts or fitness of the guardian, amend 
the terms of the guardianship order, or seek to be restored to capacity. 
Representation may also be sought for the purpose of influencing how 
the guardian exercises discretion or makes decisions under the terms of 
an existing guardianship. 
A person subject to guardianship may also seek legal representation 
for a matter that is unrelated to the guardianship. For example, the 
person may be a party to a civil or criminal case, or may require legal 
assistance to exercise a retained right. This right might be one not 
covered by the provisions of a limited guardianship or one that the state 
imposing the guardianship considers to be unaffected by the 
guardianship—for example, in some states the right to vote,23 marry,24 or 
make a will.
25
 
II. THE LEGALITY OF REPRESENTING PERSONS SUBJECT 
TO GUARDIANSHIP 
At first glance, it might seem incongruous to talk about an 
incapacitated person hiring an attorney. An attorney-client relationship is 
both an agency relationship and a contractual one. As a general matter, 
in order to enter into either type of relationship, an individual must have 
the legal capacity to do so. Because an attorney is an agent of the client, 
                                                     
23. See Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The 
Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 950 (2007) 
(“[N]ineteen states have specific provisions that persons under full or limited guardianship retain all 
legal and civil rights not specifically taken away, which at least by implication would include the 
right to vote. When the guardianship law provisions that favor limits on the removal of rights are 
examined, the argument can be made that persons in thirty-two states found to be sufficiently 
incapacitated to need a guardian may be eligible to vote under certain circumstances.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
24. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1900 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 2015–2016 
2d Exec. Sess.) (stating a person under conservatorship retains the right to marry); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 524.5-120 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (reserving ward’s rights, unless 
restricted by court order, to marry and to vote, among others). 
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-20 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Year) (stating the 
appointment of a guardianship is not a determination regarding the right to vote or testamentary 
capacity); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.29(b) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2016) (stating 
appointment of a guardian is not conclusive evidence that a person lacks capacity to dispose of 
property by will); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 41(B) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring a will executed by a person subject to guardianship to be signed and acknowledged in the 
presence of a judge). 
09 - Kohn & Koss.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2016  7:06 PM 
2016] REPRESENTING PERSONS SUBJECT TO GUARDIANSHIP 589 
 
the attorney’s ability to act on behalf of a client may be limited by what 
the client is legally authorized to do. Likewise, lack of capacity to enter 
into a contract may prevent a client from signing an engagement 
agreement or committing to compensate the lawyer. 
Despite this apparent paradox, the law permits attorneys to represent 
persons subject to guardianship and to be compensated for that 
representation. As this Article shows: (1) agency principles do not bar 
such representation; (2) contract principles do not bar such 
representation; and (3) even if such representation were inconsistent 
with state law (whether it be agency law, contract law, or the statutory 
law governing guardianship), constitutional due process protections 
would require that exceptions be made to permit representation of 
persons subject to guardianship, at the very minimum to challenge the 
terms or existence of their guardianships and arguably under a broader 
set of circumstances. 
A. Squaring Representation of Persons Subject to Guardianship with 
Agency Law 
When an attorney undertakes representation of a client, the attorney is 
agreeing to act as the client’s agent. The client is thus the “principal” 
who directs the agent as to the objectives of the representation and the 
means of achieving them.
26
 Under traditional agency law, the agent’s 
authority is derived from the authority of the principal. In order to have 
the capacity to serve as principal in an agency relationship, an individual 
generally must possess the legal capacity to carry out the acts he or she 
is delegating to the agent.
27
 If the principal does not have the legal 
capacity to carry out an action, neither does the agent.
28
 Therefore, the 
general rule is that the agent’s authority terminates once the principal 
has been adjudicated to lack capacity to do a particular act.
29
 States can, 
of course, create exceptions to this general principle of agency law. For 
example, all states have statutorily authorized durable powers of attorney 
that allow an agent to continue to take actions on behalf of a principal 
                                                     
26. The attorney is not passive in this process and should provide candid advice about the means 
of achieving the client’s goals. Ultimately, however, the attorney must defer to the client’s decisions 
or withdraw. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 at 4 (1996); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
28. Id. § 3.04(1). Comment b to section 3.04 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency explains, 
“[t]he capacity to do a legally consequential act by means of an agent is coextensive with the 
principal’s capacity to do the act in person.” Id. § 3.04 cmt. b. 
29. Id. § 3.08(1).  
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even after the principal is no longer capable.
30
 
Some might read this traditional rule of agency as barring an attorney 
from acting on behalf of a person who has been adjudicated 
incapacitated.
31
 This would be a misreading of the law of agency. An 
agent is only barred from performing acts the principal cannot carry 
out.
32
 Thus, whether or not an attorney can represent a person subject to 
guardianship in a matter depends on whether the client has been stripped 
of the right to pursue that matter. If the person subject to guardianship 
retains the right to pursue the matter, agency law does not pose any bar 
to the person subject to guardianship engaging a lawyer to assist with 
that matter. 
There are two types of rights retained by persons subject to 
guardianship. The first are rights retained under the state’s guardianship 
statute. For persons subject to limited guardianship, these rights can be 
extensive as they include any rights not explicitly stripped by the court.
33
 
Even persons subject to plenary guardianships, however, can have 
meaningful retained rights under state law. For example, state statutory 
law may specifically grant those subject to guardianship the right to 
vote.
34
 Moreover, some states explicitly preserve a right to engage 
counsel in certain situations, although they vary in the exact contours of 
this right.
35
 
The second type of rights retained by persons subject to guardianship 
are those that are constitutionally required. Specifically, despite being 
                                                     
30. See Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden Abuses of 
Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 6 (2006). 
31. See, e.g., 2 HORNER PROBATE PRAC. & ESTATES § 35:41, Westlaw (database updated May 
2016) (“Upon the appointment of a guardian, no one except the guardian can act for or on behalf of 
the ward without express authority or appointment.”). 
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(1) (“An individual has capacity to act as 
principal in a relationship of agency as defined in § 1.01 if, at the time the agent takes action, the 
individual would have capacity if acting in person.”). Notably, a person may have capacity to carry 
out some acts but not others, and an agent’s authority is defined by what the principal would be 
legally permitted to do directly. See id. § 3.08 cmt. b. 
33. Cf. In re Guardianship of Holly, 164 P.3d 137, 145 (Okla. 2007) (holding that a person 
subject to a limited guardianship continues to have the right to choose his own attorney). 
34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-120(14) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); see 
also Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 23, at 950. 
35. For example, Nebraska’s guardianship statute adopts a narrow approach, stating that a person 
subject to guardianship “may retain an attorney for the sole purpose of challenging the guardianship, 
the terms of the guardianship, or the actions of the guardian on behalf of the ward.” NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-2620(b) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.). On the other hand, the 
Minnesota guardianship statute contains a “Bill of Rights for Wards and Protected Persons” which 
grants persons subject to guardianship the right to “be represented by an attorney in any proceeding 
or for the purpose of petitioning the court.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-120(13) (Westlaw). 
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adjudicated incapacitated, a person subject to guardianship has an 
ongoing right to due process. As explored at length in Section C of this 
Part, constitutional due process guarantees require persons subject to 
guardianship to retain rights, at a minimum, related to challenging the 
terms and conditions of their guardianship.
36
 
In short, agency principles do not bar persons subject to guardianship 
from engaging an attorney to provide counsel related to—or to assist 
with the exercise of—retained rights, including rights related to 
challenging the terms and conditions of the underlying guardianship. 
B. Squaring Representation of Persons Subject to Guardianship with 
Contract Law 
Much as agency principles have raised concerns that persons subject 
to guardianship cannot authorize a lawyer to act on their behalf, contract 
principles can pose a barrier to persons subject to guardianship 
authorizing payment to attorneys who do represent them. A person 
subject to guardianship, unless the guardianship is limited, has lost the 
legal capacity to enter into a contractual agreement.
37
 The question is 
whether this lack of capacity to contract presents an obstacle to an 
individual making a legally binding promise to compensate a lawyer for 
services. If it does, even if a person subject to guardianship is able to 
enter into an agency relationship with an attorney, finding one willing to 
represent a client who cannot pledge payment may be quite 
challenging.
38
 
Some courts have suggested that contract law thus prevents a person 
subject to guardianship from hiring a lawyer. For example, in In re 
Guardianship of Bockmuller,
39
 a woman subject to guardianship named 
Mary Bockmuller hired attorney William Reischmann to help her move 
back to her home against the wishes of her guardian.
40
 Consistent with 
Bockmuller’s directions, Reischmann petitioned to terminate the 
                                                     
36. See infra Section II.C.  
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12–13 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
38. Cf. Cassidy, supra note 6, at 102 (noting that concern over receiving payment for services is a 
barrier to attorneys accepting representation of persons subject to guardianship); JEROME IRA 
SOLKOFF & SCOTT M. SOLKOFF, 15 FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES, ELDER LAW § 30:267, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2015) (advising attorneys to seek court approval before representing a 
person subject to guardianship to protect against the risk of providing representation without 
compensation). 
39. 602 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
40. Id. at 609. 
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guardianship, remove the current guardian, or both.
41
 The petition was 
unsuccessful, but he nevertheless sought court approval for attorney 
fees. The court distinguished the right to counsel, granted by state 
statute,
42
 from the capacity to contract with an attorney: 
Mary’s right to contract was removed by the order determining 
her incapacity. Although Mary has a right to counsel, that 
counsel must be contracted for by one of the guardians or 
appointed by the court. . . . Because Mary’s right to contract was 
removed, she had no power to contract with Mr. Reischmann to 
represent her in any proceedings.
43
 
Such strict and un-nuanced approaches are inconsistent with 
constitutional due process guarantees discussed in Section C of this Part. 
As a U.S. Virgin Islands court reasoned in overturning a lower court’s 
decision denying payment to the attorney for the person subject to 
guardianship: 
[I]mposing an additional requirement that the ward possess the 
legal capacity to enter into a contract with retained counsel 
would make it exceedingly difficult for individuals served with 
guardianship petitions, or those attempting to terminate an 
existing guardianship, to obtain retained counsel. Any contract 
the ward entered into with retained counsel would be completely 
invalidated if the guardianship petition is granted or the petition 
to terminate the guardianship is denied.
44
 
Moreover, contract law—or, more precisely, the law of quasi-
contract—includes a doctrine that explains why, in fact, persons subject 
to guardianship can enter into valid contracts with attorneys. The 
doctrine of necessaries allows a party who supplies certain goods or 
services to a person who lacks capacity to contract to nonetheless be 
reimbursed for the value of those goods or services.
45
 Under the 
doctrine, the party who provided the goods or services may demand 
payment, even though there is not a valid underlying contract, if the 
goods or services fall into the category of necessaries.
46
 Legal services 
                                                     
41. Id. 
42. In Florida, a person subject to guardianship retains the right to counsel. FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 744.3215(1)(l) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.). 
43. In re Bockmuller, 602 So. 2d at 609 (citations omitted).  
44. In re Guardianship of Smith, 58 V.I. 446, 453–54 (2013). The attorney sought legal fees for 
representing a client prior to adjudication of incapacity. Id. A related appeal challenging the 
dismissal by the court of the attorney for the person subject to guardianship following the 
appointment of the guardian was rendered moot by the person’s death. Id. at 448. 
45. 57 C.J.S. Mental Health § 238, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2016). 
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 22 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
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have, across a variety of contexts, been found to be necessaries for the 
purpose of applying the doctrine.
47
 
The doctrine of necessaries has long been used to hold persons 
subject to guardianship liable for debts,
48
 and some courts have 
explicitly found that the doctrine can be used to reimburse an attorney 
for legal services provided to a person subject to guardianship,
49
 
including to provide legal services to challenge the guardianship itself.
50
 
For example, in Collins v. Marquette Trust Co.,
51
 the attorney who 
had represented the person subject to guardianship in the initial 
                                                     
INST. 2011) (describing duty to third persons for specific goods and services known as 
“necessaries”). 
47. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS, THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.14-3 (2013–2014) (concluding incapacitated 
individuals cannot contract, yet the doctrine of necessaries will create a liability to compensate 
counsel); Angela Zielinski, Comment, Attorney Fees as Necessaries of Life: Expanding a Domestic 
Violence Victim’s Access to Safety and Justice, 60 MONT. L. REV. 201, 217 (1999) (arguing that the 
modern rule is that legal services in divorce proceedings are considered necessaries); E.R. Tan, 
Annotation, Infant’s Liability for Services Rendered by Attorney at Law Under Contract with Him, 
13 A.L.R. 3d 1251 (1967), Westlaw (database updated weekly) (examining the doctrine of 
necessaries as applied to children with legal services contracts and concluding that legal services 
can be necessaries if designed to assist with seeking compensation for personal injuries and to assist 
with matters related to protecting personal liberty, security, and reputation); Employment or 
Services of Another, A.L.R. DIG., Westlaw ALRDG 211K1070 (database updated Mar. 2016) 
(examining the doctrine of necessaries as applied to children and indicating that legal services 
designed to assist with seeking compensation for personal injury and will contests are necessaries). 
48. The courts typically apply the doctrine of necessaries to cases involving persons subject to 
guardianship in much the same way they apply the doctrine to cases involving other incapacitated 
individuals. Thus, courts have allowed persons subject to guardianship to be held liable for 
necessaries such as medical expenses incurred by a spouse. See, e.g., In re Rauscher, 531 N.E.2d 
745, 747–49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).  
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2000).  
50. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Smith, 58 V.I. 446, 454 (2013) (attorney may be reimbursed 
for attorney’s fees that “were reasonably necessary to . . . attempt to terminate the guardianship”); In 
re Estate of Kutchins, 523 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (“As a general rule, attorney fees 
and costs incurred in the representation of an incompetent in an incompetency proceeding are a 
‘necessary’ of that incompetent for which his estate may be assessed reasonable fees by the court.”); 
Collins v. Marquette Trust Co., 246 N.W. 5, 6 (Minn. 1932) (holding that legal services are 
indistinguishable from other categories of necessaries); In re Allen, 552 N.E.2d 934, 937–38 (Ohio 
1990) (“[I]t is settled law in Ohio and in a number of other states that any debt arising out of the 
services of an attorney to a ward is in the nature of necessities. . . . It is within the province of the 
probate court to determine what constitutes a necessary good or service. For attorney fees to be 
granted in this context, a court should apply a three-part test to determine if attorney fees are 
merited . . . whether the attorney acted in good faith, whether the services performed were in the 
nature of necessities, and whether the attorney’s actions benefited the guardianship.” (citations 
omitted)); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 98 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Wis. 1959) (recognizing legal 
services can be necessaries under proper circumstances). 
51. 246 N.W. 5 (Minn. 1932). 
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appointment proceedings assisted his client in petitioning unsuccessfully 
for restoration of capacity a month after the guardian was appointed.
52
 
When he sought approval of attorney fees, the guardian objected, 
claiming that the court had no authority to approve fees for an attorney 
who had not been employed by the guardian. In granting the attorney’s 
fee request, the court observed: 
All her property being then in the hands of her guardian and 
subject to the control of the probate court, she would be 
practically helpless to carry on the proceeding for restoration to 
capacity, unless the probate court would allow sufficient of her 
property in the hands of her guardian to be used for the payment 
of necessary attorney’s fees and expenses.53 
The court qualified its holding, explaining that such services must be 
rendered in good faith and be reasonably necessary.
54
 
Similarly, in the case In re Guardianship of Hayes
55
 the person 
subject to guardianship hired an attorney to assist him in exercising his 
right to an annual re-examination of his condition. Two court-appointed 
psychiatrists examined the person subject to guardianship and 
determined that the guardianship was still necessary.
56
 The court 
approved the payment of attorney fees based on a determination that the 
legal services were necessaries, defined as follows: 
Necessaries are generally considered as what is reasonably 
necessary for the support, maintenance, care and comfort of the 
insane person according to his status and condition in life but 
not necessarily limited to his actual physical wants. A person’s 
liberty and freedom to do what he wishes with his property is a 
cherished right. An insane person should have reasonable access 
to legal services which are required for the benefit of the insane 
person or necessary for the protection of his property.
57
 
In short, the doctrine of necessaries indicates that a lack of contractual 
capacity should not be deemed as preventing a person subject to 
guardianship from entering into an enforceable, implied contract for 
                                                     
52. Id. at 5. 
53. Id. at 6. 
54. Id. 
55. 98 N.W.2d 430 (Wis. 1959). 
56. See id. at 433. 
57. Id. A similar definition of necessaries was used in Collins. 246 N.W. 5, 6 (Minn. 1932) 
(“Being necessary for the protection of the ward’s legal rights, it must be held that these 
expenditures stand on the same footing as expenses for necessary food, clothing, and other 
requirements for the ward.”). 
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certain attorney services. This does not mean, however, that attorneys 
can expect payment for all services for which persons subject to 
guardianship seek their assistance. In some situations, the doctrine may 
be inapplicable since the sought-after services cannot reasonably be said 
to fall into the category of necessaries. For example, suppose a person 
subject to guardianship schedules a meeting with the intention of seeking 
the attorney’s assistance to perform an act that she is no longer legally 
capable of doing. Were the attorney to proceed to represent the person in 
the matter after determining (or after the lawyer should have determined) 
that the individual could not carry out the act, the doctrine of necessaries 
would likely not apply.
58
 
Similarly, such an agreement may not be enforceable where the 
services in question are not reasonable. For example, the person subject 
to guardianship in In re Guardianship of Hayes engaged the same 
attorney three months later to petition for another re-examination.
59
 The 
underlying state statute entitled a person subject to guardianship to one 
re-examination per year, but a re-examination could be ordered by the 
court at any time.
60
 The court appointed two different psychiatrists who 
examined the person and came to similar conclusions as those of the first 
psychiatrists.
61
 In denying the attorney’s request for payment of fees 
related to this second re-examination, the court rejected the assertion that 
the right to seek a re-examination qualified as necessaries per se.
62
 
Instead, the court described a case-by-case assessment in which 
individuals’ rights are balanced against the need to protect them from 
financial waste.
63
 The court also stated that for legal services to be 
necessaries, there should be some reasonable basis to believe that the 
action will be successful.
64
 In this case, the court found there was no 
reason to doubt the qualifications or disinterest of the first set of 
psychiatrists.
65
 Therefore, the services provided in the second 
representation were redundant, unlikely to lead to different results, and 
                                                     
58. We hope that in such circumstances lawyers would nonetheless provide these individuals with 
pro bono advice and counsel about their rights pursuant to guardianship. 
59. 98 N.W.2d at 430. 
60. Id. at 433–34.  
61. Id. at 433. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. (“[T]he county court must carefully examine such claim so that an incompetent is not 
deprived of the means of securing his freedom and restoration to competency and yet the property 
which is necessary for his support and maintenance is not wasted.”). 
64. Id. at 434. 
65. Id. at 433. 
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did not qualify as necessaries.
66
 
The Hayes opinion thus represents a narrower and more problematic 
interpretation of the doctrine of necessaries. If courts take the type of 
balancing approach adopted in Hayes when applying the doctrine of 
necessaries—that is, weighing the need for legal representation against 
the impact of obtaining those services on the client’s financial 
resources—lower income individuals will likely be disproportionately 
denied legal representation. It is also sometimes difficult to determine in 
advance whether a case has a reasonable basis for success, and an 
attorney may reasonably be concerned that the court will engage in a 
post hoc assessment of the merits.
67
 
By contrast, Collins’ more expansive interpretation of the doctrine, 
which asks whether the services were reasonably necessary to protect the 
rights of the person subject to guardianship and whether they were 
rendered by the attorney in good faith,
68
 better reflects the underlying 
rationale of the doctrine of necessaries and appears to be the more 
modern approach.
69
 Contractual rights of persons with diminished 
capacity are restricted to protect vulnerable individuals from harm in the 
form of exploitation or fundamentally unfair agreements. The doctrine of 
necessaries recognizes that circumstances exist when restricting the right 
                                                     
66. Id. 
67. In Hayes, for example, the court held that the first petition seeking to have the petitioner 
examined by psychiatrists had merit, but that the second petition for re-examination by different 
psychiatrists did not. As it happened, the second set of psychiatrists confirmed the findings of the 
first. Had the second psychiatric report contradicted the first, the court could very well have decided 
that the petition for a second re-examination had been justified. See id. at 433–34. In contrast, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, relying on Hayes, upheld attorney fees in a successful termination 
proceeding. Comparing the case at bar to Hayes, the court stated:  
There a trial court finding that legal services were not necessary was upheld, but here, 
particularly in view of the outcome of this appeal, it is equally clear that they are to be so 
considered. While the mere fact that the ward is unsuccessful at a hearing or on appeal is not to 
be the determining factor as to the necessity of legal services involved, a “. . . reasonable basis 
and hope for success” are factors to be given weight. In the case before us, appellant appealed 
the portion of the trial court order denying a termination of the guardianship over her estate. 
Two issues of law were raised, and on both the essential position of appellant was sustained. 
Clearly the attorney’s fees involved in taking this appeal are to be considered necessaries, to be 
allowed and paid out of the guardianship estate. 
In re Guardianship of Claus, 172 N.W.2d 643, 646–47 (Wis. 1969) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hayes, 98 N.W.2d at 433). 
68. Collins v. Marquette Trust. Co., 246 N.W. 5, 6 (Minn. 1932).  
69. See In re Guardianship of Smith, 58 V.I. 446, 454 (2013) (allowing fees “reasonably 
necessary to . . . attempt to terminate the guardianship” and not considering effect on finances); In 
re Allen, 552 N.E.2d 934, 934–35 (Ohio 1990) (listing three factors relevant to the determination of 
whether fees constituted necessaries, none of which included the impact on the person’s finances). 
Although later opinions appear to adopt a more liberal approach, the small number of reported cases 
makes it difficult to identify trends with certainty. 
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to contract potentially causes more harm than allowing a person to enter 
a contractual agreement. When the general restriction prevents a person 
from obtaining needed services, the protective justification for the 
restriction no longer applies.
70
 Relative to other types of agreements that 
persons subject to guardianship might attempt to enter into, an attorney-
client arrangement is relatively lower risk because there are already a 
wide range of safeguards to protect clients from exploitative or unfair 
contracts with attorneys. Most guardianship statutes require attorneys’ 
fees to be approved in advance of payment by the court overseeing the 
guardianship,
71
 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 prohibits 
attorneys from charging or collecting unreasonable fees or expenses,
72
 
and Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 prohibits an attorney from 
bringing or defending frivolous proceedings with no basis in law or 
fact.
73
 Thus, in this context, it is particularly appropriate to interpret the 
doctrine of necessaries broadly so as to minimize the negative effects of 
treating persons subject to guardianship as lacking contractual capacity. 
In short, the doctrine of necessaries should be interpreted broadly to 
allow attorneys to be compensated for the good faith provision of 
services reasonably necessary to protect the rights of persons subject to 
guardianship. Even under a narrower interpretation of the doctrine, 
however, attorneys can be compensated for representing persons subject 
to guardianship under some circumstances. Thus, contract law is not an 
insurmountable barrier to access to counsel for persons subject to 
guardianship. 
C. Constitutional Protections of Access to Counsel 
The preceding two Sections have shown why at least some forms of 
representation of persons subject to guardianship are permitted despite 
contract and agency law principles that might suggest otherwise. Even if 
contract law or agency law were inconsistent with persons subject to 
guardianship engaging attorneys to represent them, such persons would 
still have a constitutional right to representation in certain situations. 
While guardianship is often strongly criticized for stripping 
                                                     
70. Cf. Steve Hedley, Implied Contract and Restitution, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 435, 440–42 (2004) 
(discussing the purpose of the doctrine of implied contract). 
71. To the extent that refusal to approve fees may serve as a barrier to legitimate legal 
representation, courts should be cautious in exercising their authority. 
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). For discussion of the 
role and importance the Model Rules, see infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
73. Id. r. 3.1. 
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individuals of their legal personhood, even those subject to the most 
drastic plenary guardianships retain certain legal rights guaranteed to 
them under the Federal Constitution. These retained rights include the 
right to both procedural and substantive due process under the law as 
guaranteed by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides 
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”74 
These rights are not extinguished merely because a person has been 
found to lack capacity under proper legal procedures. While the United 
States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the due process rights 
of persons subject to guardianship, the Court has considered the rights of 
persons subject to involuntary commitment
75
 and found that such 
persons retain due process rights.
76
 As other courts have recognized, the 
two situations are analogous, and the Supreme Court’s reasoning with 
regard to involuntary commitment can—and should—be applied to 
conclude that persons subject to guardianship retain due process rights 
even after being lawfully adjudicated incapacitated.
77
 Consistent with 
this approach, courts that have considered the question generally 
recognize that persons subject to guardianship retain a constitutionally 
protected due process interest.
78
 
The leading precedent outlining the contours of the constitutional 
right to procedural due process, Mathews v. Eldridge,
79
 states that the 
process due depends on: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
                                                     
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
75. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (finding that a disabled person who had 
been involuntarily committed retained substantive due process rights). 
76. See id. 
77. In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Iowa 1995) (finding that the deprivation 
of liberty created by guardianship is analogous to that created by involuntary institutionalization). 
78. See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425 (Surr. Ct. 2010) (finding that a person subject to 
guardianship’s due process rights include periodic review of the guardianship). Similarly, it is 
widely agreed, although the Supreme Court has never directly decided the issue, that due process 
requirements as set forth in Mathews require allegedly incapacitated persons subject to guardianship 
proceedings have notice of those proceedings and opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Susan G. 
Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process, and Protective Proceedings, 2 MARQ. ELDER L. 
ADVISOR 13, 15–16 (2000), http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1328&context=elders [https://perma.cc/USU4-G4N5] (walking the reader through the 
application of Mathews to guardianship proceedings). 
79. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
80
 
The first Mathews factor weighs heavily in favor of finding that 
persons subject to guardianship retain robust procedural due process 
rights. Guardianship poses an ongoing threat to liberty by the state. As 
such, both the continuance of a guardianship and the terms and 
conditions by which it is imposed trigger Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to due process.
81
 In addition, by labeling the person subject to 
guardianship as incapacitated, guardianship creates an ongoing “badge 
of infamy” of a type that the United States Supreme Court has also 
recognized as implicating due process interests.
82
 For this reason too, the 
continuance of guardianship triggers procedural due process rights. 
The second Mathews factor also weighs heavily in favor of finding 
that persons subject to guardianship retain substantial procedural due 
process rights. A person’s cognitive capacity depends on a number of 
different factors. Some of these are stable, but many others are not. For 
example, capacity can be significantly diminished by acute medical 
conditions, which may subsequently be cured or ameliorated.
83
 A 
person’s functional capacity may also be affected by the person’s 
environment and resources, including the availability of support 
networks and services.
84
 A person who is able to acquire an effective 
form of decision-making support may, therefore, be able to regain the 
capacity to make decisions she was previously unable to make despite 
                                                     
80. Id. at 335. 
81. Cf. In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 426 (discussing how the deprivation of liberty created 
by guardianship gives rise to due process rights of persons subject to guardianship). 
82. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (holding that procedural due 
process required a state to give persons notice and opportunity to be heard before posting their 
names as persons to whom liquor sales were prohibited because of prior excessive drinking because, 
by so doing, the law created a “badge of infamy”); In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d at 574 
(analogizing the “badge of infamy” at issue in Constantineau to that created by a determination of 
incapacity through a guardianship determination).   
83. Cf. AM. BAR ASS’N & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF CAPACITY IN OLDER 
ADULTS PROJECT WORKING GROUP, COMMISSION ON LAW AND AGING, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER 
ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 9–15 (2008) (illustrating 
the complexity of capacity assessment and importance of contextual factors with the hypothetical 
example of Mr. Olsen whose diminished capacity may be at least in part attributable to reversible 
causes including an adverse medication reaction, renal failure, social isolation, and anxiety). 
84. For example, the quality of the relationship between a person with dementia and the person’s 
primary caregiver as well as caregiver stress levels have been found to influence the functional and 
problem-solving capacity of the person with dementia. See Astri Ablitt et al., Living with Dementia: 
A Systematic Review of the Influence of Relationship Factors, 13 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 497 
(2009). 
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no other changes in her medical condition. Situations that were once 
dangerous for a person with diminished capacity may become safer, 
allowing that individual to regain independence. If persons subject to 
guardianship are unable to advocate for restoration of their capacity, 
either in part or in total, there is a serious risk that they will continue to 
be subjected to a severe deprivation of liberty that—even if previously 
appropriate—is no longer necessary. 
The third Mathews factor also weighs in favor of finding robust 
procedural due process rights, although perhaps not as heavily as the 
first two. Although states have an interest in lowering the costs of court 
administration, the purpose of guardianship is to protect the person 
subject to guardianship, even if that protection comes at the expense of 
the taxpayer as in the case of indigent persons subject to the protection 
of a public guardian. In some cases, welcoming challenges to 
guardianship may actually reduce overall court expenditures. If a 
particular arrangement is not in fact protective, it is not in the state’s 
interest to devote court resources to overseeing the guardianship. If the 
rights of a person subject to guardianship are restored, court oversight of 
guardianship is no longer needed. 
Thus, the Mathews factors indicate that persons subject to 
guardianship have a substantial constitutionally protected interest in 
meaningful access to procedures that allow them to challenge the 
existence and breadth of their guardianships. When a person subject to 
guardianship is seeking to challenge the terms or existence of the 
guardianship, the guardian has a conflict of interest that makes it 
untenable to defer to her to protect the due process interests of the 
person subject to guardianship.
85
 At a bare minimum, procedural due 
process should be interpreted as requiring that such persons have the 
opportunity to directly (i.e., without approval of the guardian or a court) 
challenge the continuance or breadth of their guardianships.
86
 Procedural 
due process rights in this context should also be interpreted as requiring 
that persons subject to guardianship have the ability to directly challenge 
                                                     
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. f. (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). This conflict of interest is further suggested by the fact that guardians appear to frequently 
oppose petitions for restoration when they are brought by persons subject to guardianship. See 
Cassidy, supra note 6, at 107. 
86. Using this general line of reasoning, attorney Patricia Cavey has challenged the “myth” that 
an incapacitated person lacks the ability to hire an attorney, but one can be hired by the guardian on 
the individual’s behalf. See Cavey, supra note 3, at 28 (“In a very real sense, a guardianship is the 
legal death of the ward, stripping the ward of the freedom and power that adults in a free society are 
presumed to enjoy. The fundamental liberty and property rights at stake in a guardianship are also 
exactly the reason why the myth does not apply to the right to counsel.”). 
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certain terms and conditions of the guardianship, including the selection 
of a particular individual to serve as a guardian. Here too, the guardian 
has an intractable conflict of interest that makes it untenable to defer to 
the guardian to protect the person’s due process interest. Indeed, without 
an ability to directly be heard, it would be virtually impossible for a 
person subject to guardianship to appeal a determination of incapacity, 
challenge the actions of a guardian, or seek to alter or terminate the 
guardianship. 
Arguably, the person subject to guardianship also has a substantive 
due process right that supports the ongoing right to counsel.
87
 There is a 
line of constitutional jurisprudence that suggests that substantive due 
process requires states to adhere to the principle of the least restrictive 
alternative (i.e., to not infringe on individual rights more than necessary 
to achieve the government’s purpose) when depriving citizens of rights 
on the basis of disability.
88
 If persons subject to guardianship cannot 
engage an attorney to directly challenge their guardianship arrangement, 
including to seek restoration of capacity or of certain legal rights, it will 
not be possible to adhere to this principle.
89
 
To deny persons subject to guardianship access to legal representation 
                                                     
87. Norman Fell, Guardianship and the Elderly: Oversight Not Overlooked, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 
189, 202 (1994) (presenting the claim that the least restrictive alternative is constitutionally required 
in the guardianship context). 
88. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), which stated that 
“[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for 
achieving the same basic purpose,” gave rise to significant speculation that the state must abide by 
the least restrictive alternative when limiting individual rights. Id. at 488. This understanding was 
significantly undermined by the Court’s later decision in Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993), in 
which the Court held that a statute can withstand rational basis review even though the state has not 
used the least intrusive means necessary to achieve its purpose. Id. at 329–30. Since Heller did not 
directly refute the statement in Shelton, and since there is a line of post-Shelton jurisprudence 
supportive of the least restrictive alternative as constitutional mandate, an argument can continue to 
be made that there is a constitutionally protected substantive due process interest in having the state 
adhere to the least restrictive alternative principle. That said, the current trend is not to expand the 
doctrine. See Michael L. Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate 
the Constitutional “Least Restrictive Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. 
REV. 999, 1000–02 (2000) (discussing the history of cases suggesting a constitutionally grounded 
“least restrictive alternative” and describing the status of this approach as murky and muddled); 
Judith A. Goldberg, Note, Due Process Limitations on Involuntary Commitment of Individuals Who 
Abuse Drugs or Alcohol, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1481, 1498 (1995) (discussing the impact of Heller on the 
constitutional status of the least restrictive alternative principle in the involuntary commitment 
context). 
89. See In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 855 (Surr. Ct. 2012) (reasoning that 
“[t]o the extent that New York courts have recognized least restrictive alternative as a constitutional 
imperative . . . proof that a person with an intellectual disability needs a guardian must exclude the 
possibility of that person’s ability to live safely in the community supported by family, friends and 
mental health professionals” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 
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in order to challenge the existence, terms, or conditions of a 
guardianship would be to impose restrictions on their rights beyond 
those strictly needed for their protection. The right to be represented by 
an attorney is fundamentally different from other rights taken from a 
person subject to guardianship in that its exercise typically results in 
more protection for the person subject to guardianship, not less. An 
attorney can serve as a check on unnecessary infringements of liberty, an 
advocate in decision-making, and a watchdog to make sure the guardian 
acts responsibly. Moreover, as discussed earlier, attorney-client 
relationships are generally highly regulated relative to other types of 
agreements into which persons subject to guardianship might attempt to 
enter.
90
 
In short, even after being adjudicated incapacitated, a person subject 
to guardianship has important retained procedural and substantive due 
process rights with regard to matters related to the guardianship. In 
addition, those subject to limited guardianship—and those in states that 
recognize that certain rights are retained absent an adjudication to the 
contrary—may have retained rights related to matters outside of the 
guardianship. 
These rights may, naturally, require legal advice or advocacy to 
exercise. Indeed, having the right to directly challenge the continued 
necessity or terms of the guardianship, including who serves as guardian, 
is virtually meaningless without the accompanying right to legal 
representation.
91
 Recognition of this practical necessity is reflected in the 
fact that almost all state guardianship statutes extend the right to counsel 
to persons subject to guardianship involved in certain adversarial 
guardianship proceedings.
92
 Moreover, to deprive persons subject to 
                                                     
90. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
91. An Illinois appellate court recognized this in In re Estate of Thompson, 542 N.E.2d 949 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1989), in which the court held that a person subject to guardianship had a right to counsel 
to seek restoration of his rights. Id. at 951. In so doing, the court explained that this right was 
designed to “ensure that disabled adults are afforded their procedural and constitutional rights, one 
of these rights being the right to be represented by counsel.” Id. at 952. 
92. Some statutes implicitly extend the right to counsel that exists in an initial guardianship 
hearing by requiring the same procedural safeguards that apply in petitions to appoint a guardian to 
particular procedures that can occur after the appointment of a guardian. See ALA. CODE § 26-2A-
110 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to follow same procedures to safeguard 
ward’s rights before appointing a successor guardian or restoring ward to capacity); ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 13.26.125 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to follow same 
procedures and empowering the court to send a visitor before removing a guardian, changing a 
guardian’s responsibilities, or ordering the guardianship to be modified or terminated); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-5307 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to follow same 
procedures before substituting a guardian, accepting a guardian’s resignation, or restoring a ward’s 
capacity); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-318 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) 
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(requiring court to follow same procedures before terminating a guardianship); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 560:5-318 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to follow same 
procedures before terminating a guardianship); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-307 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to follow same procedures before removing a 
guardian, accepting the guardian’s resignation, or ordering restoring the ward’s capacity); LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4554 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court, except for good 
cause, to follow substantially same procedures before changing or terminating an interdiction 
judgment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-307 (Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring court to follow same procedures before removing a guardian or accepting a guardian’s 
resignation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-311 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Annual 
Sess.) (requiring court to follow same procedures before appointing a successor guardian or 
restoring capacity); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5310 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring court to follow same procedures before removing a guardian, appointing a successor 
guardian, changing the terms of the guardianship, or terminating the guardianship); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 524.5-317 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court, except as otherwise 
ordered by the court for good cause, to follow same procedures before terminating a guardianship); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-325(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (requiring court to follow 
same procedures before appointing a successor guardian or restoring the ward’s capacity); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2620 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to follow 
same procedures before removing a guardian, accepting a guardian’s resignation, or restoring the 
ward’s capacity); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:39 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring 
court to follow same procedures before removing a guardian, accepting a guardian’s resignation, or 
restoring the ward’s capacity); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-307 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. 
Sess.) (requiring court to follow same procedures upon the filing of a petition to terminate the 
guardianship, for reasons other than death of incapacitated person, or in a proceeding that increases 
guardian’s authority or reduces protected person’s autonomy); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-28-07 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to follow same procedures before 
removing a guardian, accepting a guardian’s resignation, or finding that the ward is no longer 
incapacitated and terminating the guardianship); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.090 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (granting same rights and procedures when motion to terminate is filed 
and opposed by fiduciary); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5512.2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.) (granting same rights in review hearing); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-3-108 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (granting same rights in hearing on petition to modify or terminate 
conservatorship); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-307 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.) 
(requiring court to follow same procedures before removing a guardian, accepting a guardian’s 
resignation, or finding that the ward is no longer incapacitated). Other states expressly recognize the 
right of a person subject to guardianship to be represented in certain procedures related to the 
guardianship. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1471 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 2015–
2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (requiring appointment in proceeding to terminate conservatorship, remove 
conservator, modify legal capacity, or remove conservatee from place of residence); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 45a-649a (West, Westlaw through 2016) (granting conserved person right to attorney 
in proceedings subsequent to appointment of conservator); id. § 45a-681a(6) (Westlaw) (granting 
person with an intellectual disability the right to attorney in annual guardianship review); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 744.464 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring notice to ward’s 
attorney, if any, of filing of suggestion of capacity and, if contested, requiring court-appointed 
attorney if ward not already represented); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-42 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Legis. Year) (reserving the ward’s right to bring guardianship-related action through legal counsel); 
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11a-21 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (entitling ward to 
be represented by counsel in hearing on termination, modification, or revocation); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 387.620 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (entitling disabled person right to 
counsel in hearing on petition to terminate or modify guardianship, remove or replace guardian, or 
renew guardianship appointment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-106 (Westlaw) (stating 
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guardianship of such representation would expand the scope of the 
guardianship beyond what is ordered by the court, thereby violating both 
procedural due process guarantees and potentially the person’s 
substantive due process rights by making the guardianship more 
restrictive than necessary.
93
 
Some might argue that these due process rights could be adequately 
protected by providing for a guardian or court to hire an attorney for the 
person subject to guardianship. However, such provision would render 
the right to counsel hollow. If forced to defer to a potential adversary 
                                                     
that provision allowing court to appoint attorney for ward does not limit ward’s right to retain 
counsel of own choice to defend or prosecute petition under guardianship statutes); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 524.5-120 (Westlaw) (reserving the ward’s right to be represented by an attorney in any 
proceeding or to petition the court); MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.083(b) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d 
Reg. Sess.) (entitling ward to legal representation if petition to restore capacity filed without joinder 
of guardian); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2620 (Westlaw) (authorizing the ward to retain counsel 
for the sole purpose of challenging the guardianship, the terms of the guardianship, or the guardian’s 
actions); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.36 (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2016) (granting right to 
jury trial in proceedings to discharge guardian or modify guardianship if incapacitated person, 
individually or through counsel, raises an issue of fact as to incapacitated person’s ability to provide 
for personal needs or manage property); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35A-1130 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (granting ward right to be represented by counsel or guardian ad litem in 
hearing on restoration of capacity); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.49 (West, Westlaw through 131st 
Gen. Assemb. 2015-16) (allowing ward or ward’s attorney to request hearing to evaluate continued 
necessity of guardianship); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 3-106(A)(7), 3-107 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (granting person found to be incapacitated right to court-appointed 
counsel upon request—or sua sponte if the respondent is not capable of making informed 
decisions—in any hearing conducted pursuant to Article III of Guardianship Act); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 125.300 (Westlaw) (reserving protected person’s right to contact and retain counsel unless 
otherwise ordered by the court); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-15-18 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Sess.) (allowing ward to retain counsel to request removal of guardian); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. 
§§ 1202.101, .103 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to appoint attorney ad 
litem to represent ward in proceedings for modification or restoration and permitting ward to retain 
attorney in proceeding to modify guardianship or restore capacity); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3065 
(West, Westlaw through 2015–2016 Adjourned Sess.) (requiring court to appoint counsel for 
respondent in any proceeding once the initial guardianship petition is filed, if requested); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 11.88.120 (2014) (recognizing the right of a person subject to guardianship to be 
represented by counsel and requiring the person be given reasonable notice of right to be 
represented by attorney of own choosing at any hearing to modify or terminate guardianship); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-4-6 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to appoint 
counsel for protected person in proceedings related to modification, termination, or revocation); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.42 (West, Westlaw through 2015) (granting the ward right to counsel upon 
request or if court determines interests of justice requires representation of ward); id. § 54.64(2)(b) 
42 (Westlaw) (granting ward right to retain and contract for payment of attorney, subject to court-
approval, or court-appointed counsel in review proceedings).   
93. E.g., N.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 16 (1999), http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ 
ethics.asp?page=304 [https://perma.cc/239U-V7WC] (stating that a person subject to guardianship 
was “entitled to counsel of her own choosing particularly with regard to a proceeding [to challenge 
imposition of guardianship because it] so clearly and directly affects her freedom to continue to 
make decisions for herself”). 
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(the guardian) to select one’s counsel, the person would have no viable 
mechanism—without an attorney—for challenging a failure to make 
such provisions. Furthermore, unless permitting a person subject to 
guardianship to engage her own attorney poses a substantial risk of 
harm, delegating this right to the guardian is an unnecessary 
infringement on rights that is inconsistent with the least restrictive 
alternative principle. 
We recognize, of course, that the right of a person subject to 
guardianship to engage an attorney is not unlimited. Neither procedural 
nor substantive due process rights entitle a person subject to 
guardianship to retain the right to make decisions that the guardian has 
lawfully been authorized to make, and thus do not entitle such persons to 
engage an attorney to represent them as to those decisions. Several 
courts have explicitly recognized this distinction. For example, in In re 
Guardianship of Giventer,
94
 after a guardian and conservator were 
appointed, Giventer engaged her attorneys to provide ongoing legal 
services for her, including filing an appeal challenging the 
guardianship.
95
 Once the appeal had been resolved in favor of the 
guardianship continuing, an objection was filed challenging Giventer’s 
attorneys’ authority to represent her further.96 Under the relevant 
Nebraska statute, a person subject to guardianship was only authorized 
to be represented by an attorney “for the sole purpose of challenging the 
guardianship, the terms of the guardianship, or the actions of the 
guardian on behalf of the ward.”97 Giventer responded by asserting her 
right to be represented to challenge the payment of attorney fees and 
costs (payable to lawyers representing the guardian and conservator) out 
of her estate. She claimed that her guardian’s refusal to contest these 
fees was a “term of the guardianship.”98 The court disagreed, finding that 
she was not challenging the guardianship, the terms of the guardianship, 
or the actions of the guardian, and therefore was not entitled to 
representation.
99
 
In short, due process guarantees mean that persons subject to 
guardianship must have the opportunity to challenge the existence, 
                                                     
94. Nos. A-11-806, A-11-974, 2013 WL 2106656 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2013). 
95. Id. at *1. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at *3 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2620(b) (Westlaw)). 
98. Id. at *2. 
99. Id. at *4. This distinction was also recognized by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in In re 
Guardianship of Hocker, 791 N.E.2d 302 (Mass. 2003), discussed infra notes 172–180 and 
accompanying text.  
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terms, and conditions of their guardianships and to employ an attorney to 
assist in this process. By contrast, such persons do not have a due 
process right to representation with regard to tasks that have been 
delegated to the guardian. This limitation, however, does not mean that a 
person subject to guardianship can necessarily be stripped of the right to 
challenge any decision made by the guardian. If the person is not simply 
challenging the guardian’s judgment, but rather is alleging that the 
guardian acted in a manner inconsistent with the guardian’s authority 
(e.g., the guardian breached a fiduciary duty), due process rights may 
well attach. 
D. Statutory Protections of Access to Counsel 
In addition to the constitutional protections discussed in the preceding 
Section, many states have adopted statutes that explicitly or implicitly 
require persons subject to guardianship be permitted to engage counsel 
to represent their interests in certain conditions. In some states, there is 
an explicit right to counsel, for example, to seek restoration of rights.
100
 
Even more states have adopted the “least restrictive alternative” standard 
which may have a similar effect.
101
 
The least restrictive alternative standard requires that guardianship 
only be imposed if there is no less restrictive alternative available and 
that, when imposed, guardianships be no more restrictive than 
necessary.
102
 A court order stripping an individual of the ability to 
engage counsel to represent her—with regard to retained rights or for the 
purpose of challenging the existence, terms, or conditions of the 
guardianship—would be inconsistent with this standard. 
Most states have codified the least restrictive alternative standard in 
their guardianship statutes. In many cases, this reflects the states’ 
decision to adopt language from the 1997 version of the Uniform 
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act (UGPPA)
103
 which 
                                                     
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
101. See infra notes 104–08. 
102. See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1997) (describing the principle of least restrictive alternative as, among other things, 
requiring that a court only remove “those rights that the incapacitated person no longer can exercise 
or manage”); Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on the Mentally Disabled & Comm. on Legal Problems of the 
Elderly, Guardianship: An Agenda for Reform, 13 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 271, 
293 (1989) (discussing the least restrictive alternative approach). 
103. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5304 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-311 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 560:5-311 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
190B, § 5-306 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Annual Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-310 
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embraced the standard by permitting the appointment of a guardian only 
if the court finds “the respondent’s identified needs cannot be met by 
less restrictive means.”104 The vast majority of states require the court to 
consider whether guardianship is necessary, whether the respondent’s 
needs or interests could be protected by less restrictive means, or both.
105
 
                                                     
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). As of the date of publication, the UGPPA was under 
revision. 
104. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 311(a)(1)(B). The comment to 
this section explains, “[t]he Act’s emphasis on less restrictive alternatives, a high evidentiary 
standard and the use of limited guardianship is consistent with the Act’s philosophy that a guardian 
should be appointed only when necessary, only for as long as necessary, and with only those powers 
as are necessary.” Id. § 311 cmt.  
105. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.26.090 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (limiting 
use of guardianship to where necessary to promote and protect incapacitated person’s well-being); 
id. § 13.26.113 (Westlaw) (permitting court to dismiss petition if finds alternatives are feasible and 
adequate); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-213 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2015 1st 
Exec. Sess.) (requiring court to consider feasibility of less restrictive alternatives before imposing 
guardianship); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1800.3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 2015–2016 
2d Exec. Sess.) (prohibiting appointment of conservator unless court expressly finds granting 
conservatorship is least restrictive alternative); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-650 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016) (permitting court to appoint conservator only if findings include conservatorship is 
least restrictive means of intervention available); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331 (West, through 
Westlaw 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (limiting appointment of guardianship to situations in which court 
finds no sufficient alternative exists); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11a-12 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (permitting court to appoint limited guardian if necessary for protection of 
disabled person and plenary guardian if court determines limited guardian insufficiently protective); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-5-3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to appoint 
guardian if finds necessary to provide care and supervision of incapacitated person); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 633.556 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (permitting court to appoint guardian if 
necessity proved by clear and convincing evidence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3067 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to deny guardianship petition if other appropriate and 
sufficient alternatives exist); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.540 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2016 
Reg. Sess.) (requiring interdisciplinary evaluation team to consider whether alternatives to 
guardianship are available); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 389, 390 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(allowing court to order partial or full interdiction for individual whose interests cannot be protected 
by less restrictive means); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5306a (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.) (requiring proof of incapacity and need for a guardianship to be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-306 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) 
(permitting guardianship only as necessary to promote and protect well-being of person); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 159.055 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring necessity of 
guardianship be proven by clear and convincing evidence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:9 
(Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring finding that (1) guardianship is necessary; (2) no 
alternative resources are available; and (3) guardianship is least restrictive intervention); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (permitting guardianship to 
be used only as necessary); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 
2016) (permitting court to appoint a guardian if it determines appointment necessary); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2111.02 (West, Westlaw through 131st Gen. Assemb. 2015-16) (requiring a finding 
of necessity and permitting court to deny petition for guardianship if it finds less restrictive 
alternative available); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-111 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. 
Sess.) (requiring court to determine if guardianship is needed); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.300 
 
09 - Kohn & Koss.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2016  7:06 PM 
608 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:581 
 
A number of states also reference the least restrictive alternative 
standard in describing legislative intent or the purpose of 
guardianship.
106
 
States adopting a least restrictive alternative standard also generally 
require that, if guardianship is granted, the guardianship order be limited 
to what is necessary to protect the interests of the person subject to 
guardianship.
107
 In addition, some states impose ongoing requirements to 
                                                     
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (permitting guardianship only as necessary to protect 
protected person’s well-being); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-15-2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Sess.) (requiring petitioner to describe steps taken to use less restrictive alternative); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 29A-5-312 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (listing availability of less restrictive 
alternatives as factor in determining need for guardianship); 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 1291 (requiring 
court to determine alternatives to guardianship are not feasible); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3063 
(West, Westlaw through 2015–2016 Adjourned Sess.) (requiring petitioner to describe alternatives 
considered and why they are unavailable or unsuitable); id. § 3065 (Westlaw) (requiring counsel for 
respondent to seek to ensure there are no less restrictive alternatives); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2007 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (listing availability of less restrictive alternatives as factor 
in determining need for guardianship); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-2-10 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.) (listing availability of less restrictive alternatives as factor in determining whether 
individual is a protected person); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.10 (West, Westlaw through 2015) 
(requiring court to find individual’s needs are unable to be met less restrictively though means 
person will accept); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-104 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) 
(permitting court to appoint guardian upon finding that necessity proved by a preponderance of 
evidence). A few states require the court to find a guardianship is necessary or desirable. ALA. 
CODE § 26-2A-105 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-304 
(Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-304 (West, Westlaw through 2016); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-304 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Special Sess.) (permitting court to 
appoint guardian if satisfied that appointment is necessary or desirable to provide care and 
supervision of incapacitated person). 
106. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.1012 (West, through Westlaw 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (declaring the 
legislative intent of making available the least restrictive form of guardianship); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 387.500 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (stating, to fulfill legislative 
purpose, guardianship should be utilized only as necessary to promote well-being of disabled 
persons); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2601.02 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(declaring legislative intent to encourage least restrictive alternative possible); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 
LAW § 81.01 (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2016) (declaring desire of legislature to make 
available least restrictive form of intervention that assists individuals to meet needs while permitting 
exercise of independence and self-determination); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5502 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (declaring the purpose of guardianship statute to include protecting rights 
of incapacitated persons through the use of the least restrictive alternative); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 33-15-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess.) (declaring the legislature’s intent to make the least 
restrictive form of guardianship available); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3060 (West, Westlaw through 
2015–2016 Adjourned Sess.) (stating policy that guardianship be utilized only as necessary to 
promote well-being and protect human and civil rights). 
107. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.26.116 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(prohibiting guardianship plan from being more restrictive than reasonably necessary and limiting 
the duties or powers assignable to a guardian to those proven necessary with no less restrictive 
alternative available); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West, through Westlaw 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring guardianship order to be least restrictive alternative and reserving ward’s right to make 
decisions in all matters ward has ability to do so, to remain as independent as possible, to access the 
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justify the continuation of the guardianship as the least restrictive 
alternative.
108
 
                                                     
court, and to counsel, among others); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. 
Year) (allowing guardianship only to the extent necessary and after a determination that less 
restrictive alternatives are not available or appropriate); id. § 29-4-20 (Westlaw) (granting ward 
right to least restrictive form of guardianship); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-303 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (stating that minimizing interference with legal capacity of wards to act 
in their own behalf best fulfills the objectives of guardianship); id. § 15-5-304 (Westlaw) 
(instructing court to issue appointive and other orders only to extent necessitated by incapacitated 
person’s limitations or conditions); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11a-3 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.) (limiting guardianship to extent necessary by individual’s limitations); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 387.660 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (imposing duty on guardian to 
only limit ward’s civil rights or personal freedom to extent necessary to provide needed care and 
services); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring court to grant guardian only powers necessary); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5306a 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (granting right to limit guardianship to powers and time 
necessary); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:1 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (defining purpose 
of guardianship statute to include imposing protective orders only to extent necessary); id. § 464-
A:25 (Westlaw) (instructing guardian to safeguard ward’s civil rights to greatest extent possible and 
restrict ward’s personal freedom only as necessary); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (stating guardianship should be ordered only to extent necessary); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35A-1201 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (stating guardianship 
should offer incompetent person opportunity to exercise rights within person’s comprehension and 
judgment and to participate as fully as possible in decisions); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-29-08 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (authorizing protective orders only to extent made 
necessary by individual’s limitations and conditions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 1-103 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (instructing court to make appointive or other orders only to 
extent necessary by incapacitated person’s limitations or conditions); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 125.300 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (stating guardianship may be ordered only to 
extent necessary and reserving all legal and civil rights not expressly limited, including right to 
contact and retain counsel); id. § 125.305 (Westlaw) (requiring guardianship order be no more 
restrictive than reasonably necessary); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-304 (West, Westlaw through 2016) 
(instructing court to make appointive or other orders only to extent necessary by incapacitated 
person’s limitations or conditions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3069 (West, Westlaw through 2015–
2016 Adjourned Sess.) (requiring court to grant guardian powers in least restrictive manner); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 11.88.005 (2014) (declaring legislative intent to restrict liberty and autonomy only to 
minimum extent necessary); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.10 (West, Westlaw through 2015) (limiting 
guardian’s powers to what are necessary and requiring the exercise of powers in a manner that 
constitutes the least restrictive form of intervention). 
108. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-656, -660 (West, Westlaw through 2016) (requiring 
conservator to state in annual report whether conservatorship remains least restrictive alternative 
and court to conduct periodic reviews of conservatorship and to terminate conservatorship unless 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that conserved person continues to be incapable and no less 
restrictive alternatives are available); DEL. CH. CT. R. 180-C (West, Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2016) 
(requiring court to terminate guardianship upon finding no longer necessary); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 744.3215 (West, through Westlaw 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (granting ward rights to continuing review 
of need for restrictions of rights and to be restored to capacity as soon as possible); MD. CODE ANN., 
EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to annually 
review whether grounds for original petition continue to exist); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4-305 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring annual report to state reasons why 
guardianship should continue and why no less restrictive alternative would meet ward’s needs); 
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To deny persons subject to guardianship access to legal representation 
would impose restrictions on their rights beyond those strictly needed for 
their protection.
109
 In addition, those subject to limited guardianship—
and those in states that recognize that certain rights are retained absent 
an adjudication to the contrary—may have retained rights related to 
matters outside of the guardianship. These rights may, naturally, require 
legal advice or advocacy to exercise. To deprive the person subject to 
guardianship of such representation would expand the scope of the 
guardianship beyond what is ordered by the court, thereby making the 
guardianship more restrictive than necessary.
110
 Unless permitting a 
person subject to guardianship to engage his or her own attorney poses a 
substantial risk of harm, delegating this right to the guardian is an 
unnecessary infringement on rights that would violate the least 
restrictive alternative requirement. 
Related to the requirement that guardianship be no more restrictive 
than necessary, many state statutes affirmatively encourage or require 
courts or guardians to promote the independence and self-reliance of 
persons subject to guardianship.
111
 To the extent that legal representation 
                                                     
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35A-1242 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring guardian to 
describe efforts to seek alternatives to guardianship in status reports). 
109. As discussed supra page 601, the right to be represented by an attorney differs from other 
rights removed through a guardianship proceeding in that exercising this right generally increases 
rather than reduces the protection afforded to the person subject to guardianship because an attorney 
can check unnecessary infringements of liberty, advocate for the person, and guard against 
misconduct by the guardian. 
110. See supra note 107 
111. ALA. CODE § 26-2A-105 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to encourage 
development of the incapacitated person’s self-reliance and independence); ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.26.090 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (stating purpose of guardianship to 
encourage person’s maximum self-reliance and independence); id. § 13.26.116 (Westlaw) (requiring 
guardianship plan to be designed to encourage ward to participate in decisions and act on own 
behalf to maximum extent possible); id. § 13.26.150 (Westlaw) (requiring guardian to encourage 
ward to participate in all decisions affecting ward and act on ward’s own behalf to maximum extent 
possible); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5304 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court 
to encourage development of incapacitated person’s self-reliance and independence); id. § 14-5312 
(Westlaw) (requiring guardian, if appropriate, to encourage ward to develop maximum self-reliance 
and independence and to actively work toward limiting or terminating guardianship); CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 1801 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (requiring 
limited conservatorship to be designed to encourage conservatee’s maximum self-reliance and 
independence, and specifying legislative intent that persons with developmental disabilities receive 
services to promote independence and productivity); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-311 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court, whenever possible, to grant guardian only 
powers necessitated by ward’s limitations and to encourage development of ward’s maximum self-
reliance and independence); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656 (West, Westlaw through 2016) 
(requiring conservator to help conservatee achieve self-reliance and provide conservatee 
opportunity for meaningful participation in decision-making); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.1012 (West, 
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through Westlaw 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (declaring the best way of achieving statutory purpose is to 
permit incapacitated persons to participate as fully as possible in decisions affecting them, 
protecting their rights, and developing or regaining abilities to maximum extent possible); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 29-4-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Year) (requiring guardianship to be 
designed to help ward develop maximum self-reliance and independence); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 560:5-311 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to encourage development 
of ward’s maximum self-reliance and independence); id. § 560:5-314 (Westlaw) (imposing duty on 
guardian to encourage ward to participate in decisions, act on his or her own behalf and develop or 
regain capacity); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-303 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(stating guardianship should permit incapacitated persons to participate as fully as possible in 
decisions affecting them, protect their rights, and assist them to develop or regain abilities to 
maximum extent possible); id. § 15-5-304 (Westlaw) (instructing court to encourage development 
of maximum self-reliance and independence); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11a-3 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring guardianship to be used to encourage development of ward’s 
maximum self-reliance and independence); id. 5 / 11a-17 (Westlaw) (imposing duty on guardian to 
assist ward to develop maximum self-reliance and independence); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.635 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (permitting, but not requiring, court to authorize guardian 
to assist ward to develop maximum self-reliance and independence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring guardian to encourage ward to participate in 
decisions, act on the ward’s own behalf, and develop or regain skills and abilities as well as strive to 
protect the ward’s personal, civil, and human rights); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.500 (LexisNexis, 
LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (stating to fulfill legislative purpose guardianship must be 
designed to encourage development of maximum self-reliance and independence); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-304 (Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to exercise authority 
to encourage development of maximum self-reliance and independence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 190B, § 5-306 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Annual Sess.) (requiring court to exercise 
authority to encourage development of maximum self-reliance and independence); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 700.5306a (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (granting ward the right to 
guardianship designed to encourage development of maximum self-reliance and independence and 
the right to consult with guardian about major decisions affecting ward); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 524.5-310(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to make orders that 
encourage development of maximum self-reliance and independence); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-
306 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (requiring court to exercise authority to encourage 
development of maximum self-reliance and independence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:1 
(Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (defining purpose of guardianship statute to include 
encouraging the development of maximum self-reliance in the individual); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3B:12-57 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (instructing guardians to encourage ward’s 
participation in decision-making processes, act on ward’s own behalf, and develop decision-making 
capacity to maximum extent possible); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring guardianship to be designed to encourage the development of 
maximum self-reliance and independence); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-29-08 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring court to exercise authority to encourage development of 
maximum self-reliance and independence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 1-103 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (declaring the purpose of guardianship to be to provide for the fullest 
possible participation by wards in decisions affecting them, requiring courts to encourage the 
development of maximum self-reliance and independence, and instructing guardians to encourage 
wards to participate in decisions, act on their own behalf, and regain or develop capacities to 
maximum extent possible); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5502 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.) (declaring the purpose of guardianship statute to include permitting incapacitated persons to 
participate as fully as possible in decision-making); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-15-1 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Sess.) (declaring the legislature’s intent to permit incapacitated persons to 
participate as fully as possible in decisions, to protect rights, and assist them to regain or develop 
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enables a person to engage in decision-making, allowing a person 
subject to guardianship to be represented by an attorney furthers this 
goal, and courts and guardians might reasonably be deemed to be acting 
unlawfully by standing in the way of a person subject to guardianship 
entering into an attorney-client relationship in many situations. 
Finally, as a purely practical matter, if persons subject to guardianship 
cannot engage an attorney to directly challenge their guardianship to 
seek restoration of capacity or of certain legal rights, there would be no 
viable mechanism for enforcing the statutory requirement that courts 
adhere to the least restrictive alternative principle.
112
 Forcing a person 
subject to guardianship to rely on counsel selected by the guardian 
would mean allowing a potential adversary (the guardian) to choose and 
potentially direct the person’s attorney. This would leave the person with 
no reliable mechanism for challenging an overbroad guardianship. 
In summary, most state guardianship statutes protect the right to legal 
representation explicitly, by requiring that guardianships conform to the 
least restrictive alternative standard, or both. Moreover, depriving 
persons subject to guardianship of the right to counsel would, in many 
cases, render the guardianship more restrictive than authorized by statute 
and effectively prevent such persons subject to guardianship from 
exercising their retained rights. 
III. THE ROLE AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF ATTORNEYS 
REPRESENTING PERSONS SUBJECT TO GUARDIANSHIP 
Having determined that an attorney may lawfully represent a person 
subject to guardianship under a variety of circumstances, the question 
becomes, how should the attorney go about doing so? In this Part, we 
describe three theoretical models of representation and analyze the 
leading sources of ethical guidance, relevant case law, and ethics 
                                                     
abilities to maximum extent possible through assistance that least interferes with legal capacity); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-304 (West, Westlaw through 2016) (requiring court to exercise authority to 
encourage development of maximum self-reliance and independence); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-
5-402 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (instructing guardian to exercise authority only to extent 
necessary and, if feasible, to encourage protected person to participate in decision-making, act in 
person’s own behalf, and develop or regain capacity); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3069 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015–2016 Adjourned Sess.) (requiring guardian to encourage person under 
guardianship to participate in decisions, act on the person’s own behalf, and develop or regain 
capacity to greatest extent possible). 
112. We recognize that it is theoretically possible for persons to challenge their own 
guardianships. Doing so would be difficult, however, even for a person with no particular cognitive 
or functional limitations, and persons who have had a guardian appointed are likely to have 
significant challenges even if guardianship is not appropriate. 
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opinions to determine under what circumstances each has been applied. 
A. Three Models of Representation 
The various approaches that attorneys might take when representing a 
person subject to guardianship can be grouped into three primary models 
of representation: derivative representation, best interest, and expressed 
interest (or “normal” or “traditional” relationship).113 
In the derivative representation model, the guardian is considered the 
primary client and the person subject to guardianship is considered the 
derivative client. The lawyer thus takes direction from the guardian, at 
least to the extent that the guardian is not violating his or her fiduciary 
duty. This is a significant deviation from the normal attorney-client 
relationship in which an attorney can only take direction from a third 
party if expressly authorized to do so by the client.
114
 
Under the best interest model, by comparison, the attorney’s 
obligation is to advocate for the best interests of the person subject to 
guardianship, and thus has a duty to independently assess what the 
client’s best interests are. The attorney’s determination of the client’s 
best interests may or may not correspond with either the client’s or the 
guardian’s viewpoint.115 Thus, the best interest model also represents a 
                                                     
113. Alberto Bernabe, writing about models for representing children in the juvenile justice 
system, identifies three roughly parallel approaches. In Bernabe’s account: 
[T]hree models can be described as follows: the “expressed interests lawyer or advocate,” 
whose role is to advocate for the minor client’s expressed interests, the “best interest lawyer 
or guardian,” whose role is to substitute the lawyer’s judgment for that of the minor client 
and to advocate for what the lawyer decides are the best interests of the minor, and the 
“judicially designated investigator,” whose role is “to serve as the eyes and ears of the 
appointing authority, to gather information to share with the court, and to aid in making 
judicial decisions . . . . 
Alberto Bernabe, The Right to Counsel Denied: Confusing the Roles of Lawyers and Guardians, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 833, 836 (2012). Like Bernabe’s “judicially designated investigator,” our first 
model of representation reflects an approach in which the attorney’s primary relationship is with 
someone other than the person subject to guardianship. We choose the term “derivative 
representation” as developed by Geoffrey Hazard. See Hazard, supra note 13. This reflects the fact 
that, in this model, the attorney’s relationship to the person subject to guardianship is derived from 
the attorney’s relationship to the guardian. 
114. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
115. In part, this is because there is not a consensus as to what the determination of a person’s 
best interests should involve. One approach is to define best interests as honoring and carrying out 
the individual’s previously expressed interests, if known and if communicated when the person had 
capacity. See Cavey, supra note 3, at 31. Frolik and Whitton, by contrast, identify two types of best 
interests: strict and expanded. Strict best interest is based on what a reasonable person would do 
under the circumstances. Only the burdens and benefits that directly impact the represented person 
would be considered. Expanded best interest allows for consideration of the consequences to others 
whose interests would be relevant to the incapacitated person under a reasonable person standard. 
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significant deviation from typical practice. Normally, an attorney’s 
personal opinion of what is in a client’s best interest is not a legitimate 
basis for taking action on behalf of a client, particularly without the 
client’s consent.116 Rather, the attorney’s traditional role is to advocate 
for the client’s expressed preferences, even if these are inconsistent with 
what the attorney considers to be the preferred or appropriate course of 
action. 
Finally, under the expressed interest model, the attorney maintains the 
traditional advocacy role even when a client is subject to a guardianship. 
As described throughout the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(discussed further in the next Section), a normal attorney-client 
relationship entails keeping client communications confidential,
117
 
making sure a client stays reasonably informed about the status of the 
legal matter,
118
 and providing competent legal advice and services.
119
 
Perhaps most importantly in terms of representing a client under 
guardianship, a normal attorney-client relationship requires a lawyer to 
comply with the client’s directions regarding the objectives of the 
representation and to consult with the client regarding the means of 
achieving those objectives.
120
 Unless the client instructs the attorney to 
take action that is unlawful or frivolous, the attorney advocates for the 
client’s stated preferences regardless of whether they correspond with 
the attorney’s or others’ perceptions of what would be in the client’s best 
interest. Because of this, the expressed interest model could simply be 
referred to as a “normal relationship model.” 
B. Model Rules and Related Commentary 
1. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
The primary source of ethical guidance for attorneys is the code of 
professional conduct adopted by the court system in the state in which 
they are licensed to practice. Although there is some variation among the 
states as to the standards in those codes, the vast majority have adopted, 
in whole or in large part, the American Bar Association’s Model Rules 
                                                     
See Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standard 
for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 755–57 (2012). 
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
117. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6. 
118. Id. r. 1.4. 
119. Id. r. 1.1. 
120. Id. r. 1.2. 
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of Professional Conduct.
121
 Thus, the Model Rules are the leading source 
of guidance for attorneys representing persons subject to guardianship. 
Model Rule 1.14 directs an attorney who represents a person with 
diminished capacity to “as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal 
client-lawyer relationship.”122 The rule does recognize limited 
circumstances under which the need to protect a vulnerable client may 
justify deviating from the normal relationship. Model Rule 1.14(b) 
permits an attorney to take “reasonably necessary protective action” 
when the lawyer reasonably believes that a client has diminished 
capacity, is at risk of substantial harm, and cannot act in her own 
interest.
123
 When all three criteria are met, an attorney may veer from the 
normal attorney-client relationship, including by revealing confidential 
information or acting without the consent of the client, to the extent it is 
“reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.”124 Thus, even 
when protective action is appropriate, the client continues to be entitled 
to have her information kept confidential unless the risk to the client 
justifies a breach of confidentiality.
125
 
The main text of Model Rule 1.14 does not distinguish between 
clients whose diminished capacity has been determined by a court and 
those who have not been declared legally incapacitated. However, two of 
the comments to the Rule specifically address the situation of a client 
who has a legally appointed representative, such as a guardian. 
Comment 2 states: 
The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the 
lawyer’s obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. 
Even if the person has a legal representative, the lawyer should 
as far as possible accord the represented person the status of 
                                                     
121. See State Rules Comparison Chart, AMERICAN BAR. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/rule_charts.html [https://perma.cc/M9H9-ET2C] (last 
visited May 26, 2016). More importantly, almost every state has adopted Model Rule 1.14. See AM. 
BAR ASS’N, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.14: CLIENT 
WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_14.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9H9-ET2C]. 
122. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(a). 
123. See id. r. 1.14(b). 
124. See id. r. 1.14(b)–(c). 
125. When it was first promulgated in 1983, Model Rule 1.14 represented a significant departure 
from the emphasis on protection in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility which the Model 
Rules replaced. Subsequent amendments to both the Rule and its comments have continued to 
emphasize honoring client autonomy. See, e.g., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 344 (Art Garwin ed., 2013) (reporting 2001 
amendment to Model Rule 1.14 restricting action to only that which is “reasonably necessary”). 
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client, particularly in maintaining communication.
126
 
However, Comment 4 states, “[i]f a legal representative has already been 
appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the 
representative for decisions on behalf of the client.”127 
By advising attorneys to “ordinarily” look to the appointed 
representative to make decisions, Comment 4 undermines the main text 
of Rule 1.14. The primary guidance provided by the rule itself is that 
attorneys should default to a normal model of representation when 
working with individuals with diminished capacity and only veer from 
that model if the person with diminished capacity faces significant risk 
otherwise and such deviation is reasonably necessary. By stating that the 
ordinary approach should be to accord the representative with decision-
making authority, Comment 4 reverses this default. This reversal is 
particularly strange given that most persons with appointed 
representatives have never been adjudicated incapacitated; rather, they 
appointed the representative through a document such as a power of 
attorney, the validity of which depended on the individual having at least 
some decision-making capacity when executing it.
128
 
Comment 4 is also at odds with the unequivocal statement in 
Comment 2 that a lawyer should “as far as possible” accord a person 
with a legal representative “the status of a client.”129 Comment 4 
reverses the default approach set forth in Comment 2, making deviation 
from the normal attorney-client relationship the ordinary approach. 
Thus, not only does Model Rule 1.14 not provide clear guidance to 
attorneys trying to determine their role when representing persons 
subject to guardianship, but the guidance it does provide is arguably self-
contradictory. 
                                                     
126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 2. Comment 2 originally included the 
sentence, “[i]f the person has no guardian or legal representative, the lawyer often must act as de 
facto guardian.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). The 
removal of this sentence in 2002 again indicates an ongoing movement away from protectionism. 
However, a soft echo of Rule EC 7-12 of the Model Code can still be heard in Comment 4, 
instructing an attorney to ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of a person 
subject to guardianship.   
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
128. Durable powers of attorney are extremely common among older adults, especially among 
the oldest of the old. See AARP RESEARCH GRP., WHERE THERE IS A WILL . . . LEGAL DOCUMENTS 
AMONG THE 50+ POPULATION: FINDINGS FROM AN AARP SURVEY 5 (2000), 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/will.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2N6-BXXR] (reporting that forty-
five percent of Americans age fifty or older reported having executed a durable power of attorney, 
and that this rate increased dramatically with age such that seventy-three percent of those eighty 
years of age and older reported having executed one). 
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 4. 
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2. ACTEC Commentary 
The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC), the 
leading nonprofit association of trust and estate attorneys and scholars, 
publishes Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
These Commentaries provide detailed ethical guidance, including 
interpretations of the Model Rules, tailored for trust and estate 
attorneys.
130
 
ACTEC’s Commentary on Model Rule 1.14 pertaining to clients 
subject to guardianship initially mirrors the language of Comments 2 and 
4 of the Model Rules. The Commentary advises that an attorney “should 
ordinarily look to the representative to make decisions on behalf of the 
client,” then continues, “[t]he lawyer, however, should as far as possible 
accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in 
maintaining communication with the represented person.”131 The 
Commentary then goes on to distinguish among three situations: (1) 
initiating representation for a person already subject to guardianship, (2) 
continuing to represent a client who has subsequently been determined 
to be incapacitated, and (3) representing the fiduciary.
132
 
The ACTEC Commentary states that an attorney hired to represent a 
person with diminished capacity by the fiduciary, including a guardian 
or conservator, “stands in a lawyer-client relationship” with the 
fiduciary.
133
 It continues, “[a] lawyer who is retained by a fiduciary for a 
person with diminished capacity, but who did not previously represent 
the person with diminished capacity, represents only the fiduciary. 
Nevertheless, in such a case the lawyer for the fiduciary owes some 
duties to the person with diminished capacity.”134 The reader is directed 
to consult the ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.2 for guidance 
about what these duties might be.
135
 
When, on the other hand, there is a prior attorney-client relationship 
                                                     
130. AM. COLL. OF TR. & ESTATE COUNSEL, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4th ed. 2006), http://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/ACTEC_ 
Commentaries_4th.pdf [https://perma.cc/X33Q-97T5]. 
131. Id. at 132. 
132. Id. at 132–33. 
133. Id. at 133. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. The ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.2 deals generally with duties owed to 
fiduciaries and beneficiaries, but does not specifically address duties owed to persons subject to 
guardianship. An attorney is prohibited from taking advantage of her position to the detriment of the 
beneficiary or the fiduciary estate. Moreover, under some circumstances (which are not elaborated), 
an attorney may owe a beneficiary affirmative duties. Id. at 32–37. 
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between the attorney and the person who is subsequently found to lack 
capacity, the Commentary allows for a direct relationship to continue, at 
least in a limited way. The attorney may “continue to meet with and 
counsel” the client even after a guardian or other fiduciary has been 
appointed.
136
 When the attorney is working with the fiduciary on behalf 
of the client, but is not representing the fiduciary, her duties are to the 
client alone.
137
 It may also be possible that an attorney jointly represents 
a current or former client and the guardian. This is permissible only if 
there is no significant risk that representation of one will be adverse to or 
materially limited by representation of the other.
138
 
The Commentary contemplates a third possible situation in which the 
attorney’s only client is the guardian. An attorney who does not have an 
attorney-client relationship with the person subject to guardianship 
nevertheless owes that individual some duties. Specifically, 
[a] conflict of interest may arise if the lawyer for the fiduciary is 
asked by the fiduciary to take action that is contrary either to the 
previously expressed wishes of the person with diminished 
capacity or to the best interests of such person, as the lawyer 
believes those interests to be.
139
 
Thus, the ACTEC Commentaries on Model Rule 1.14 would find it 
ethical for an attorney to represent—and take direction from—a person 
subject to guardianship who was previously a client. They also address 
how an attorney hired by a fiduciary may represent either the fiduciary 
or the person subject to guardianship. They are, however, silent on 
whether attorneys may—and, if so, how they should—represent persons 
subject to guardianship who directly seek such representation but who 
were not clients prior to being placed under guardianship. 
3. Restatement on Law Governing Lawyers 
Another leading source of ethical guidance for attorneys is the 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers. Section 24 of the 
Restatement instructs attorneys to generally look to the guardian for 
direction when representing persons subject to guardianship. It explains, 
                                                     
136. Id. at 133. 
137. Id. (“If the lawyer represents the person with diminished capacity and not the fiduciary, and 
is aware that the fiduciary is improperly acting adversely to the person’s interests, the lawyer has an 
obligation to disclose, to prevent, or to rectify the fiduciary’s misconduct.”). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. The comment provides little guidance for what an attorney should do if such a conflict of 
interest arises, suggesting only that a lawyer “should give appropriate consideration” to the client’s 
interests. 
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“[i]f a client with diminished capacity as described in Subsection (1) has 
a guardian or other person legally entitled to act for the client, the 
client’s lawyer must treat that person as entitled to act with respect to the 
client’s interests in the matter.”140 Comment f of section 24 elaborates on 
the attorney’s duty to defer to the guardian’s authority, stating: “[w]hen 
a guardian has been appointed, the guardian normally speaks for the 
client as to matters covered by the guardianship . . . . The lawyer 
therefore should normally follow the decisions of the guardian as if they 
were those of the client.”141 
However, the Restatement recognizes a few situations when 
deference to the guardian is not appropriate. It carves out an exception 
for adversarial proceedings, such as a petition to terminate the 
guardianship or replace the guardian.
142
 It also recognizes limited 
circumstances when a person under a guardianship is authorized to take 
action without a guardian’s knowledge or permission, such as the right 
of a mature minor to seek a court order to have an abortion.
143
 However, 
if the lawyer merely disagrees with the guardian but believes the 
guardian’s actions are legal, this alone does not justify advocating for a 
position contrary to that of the guardian.
144
 
Thus, the Restatement would find it ethical for an attorney to 
represent a person subject to guardianship for the purpose of challenging 
the terms and existence of a guardianship, as well as to challenge certain 
acts or conditions imposed by guardians, and to exercise certain rights 
that do not require the guardian’s authorization. 
C. Ethics Opinions 
Every state bar association has a mechanism for regulating the ethical 
behavior of attorneys licensed by the state. To determine how states are 
interpreting attorneys’ duties when representing persons subject to 
guardianship, we performed a review of publically available state bar 
opinions as of fall 2014.
145
 We found very few opinions directly on 
point. This may reflect several things, including that attorneys are not 
accepting representation of persons subject to guardianship, or that 
                                                     
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
141. Id. cmt. f. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. (“If the lawyer believes the guardian to be acting lawfully but inconsistently with the best 
interests of the client, the lawyer may remonstrate with the guardian or withdraw . . . .”). 
145. Our search was limited to all state bar association opinions available online during fall 2014.  
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attorneys are not accepting representation of persons subject to 
guardianship in situations in which guardians or other third parties 
object. 
We found five opinions directly on point and one opinion that 
discussed the role of an attorney for a person subject to guardianship in 
dicta.
146
 Of the five directly on point, four embraced an expressed 
interest approach and one adopted a modified expressed interest 
approach that incorporated elements of a best interest approach. The 
opinion which considered the matter in dicta, by contrast, offered limited 
support for the derivative representation approach. 
The most passionate articulation of the expressed interest model is 
found in the Alaska Bar Association’s Ethics Opinion 94-3, an opinion 
involving a client described as a severely intellectually disabled person 
who was in an institution in order to receive treatment. The client 
expressed a wish to his attorney that he be allowed to leave the 
institution and receive outpatient treatment instead.
147
 In order to help 
his client fulfill this goal, the attorney determined that diagnostic tests 
would be necessary. However, the client adamantly objected to 
subjecting himself to these tests.
148
 In determining that the lawyer’s duty 
was to advocate for his client’s expressed interests, including to not be 
subjected to the tests, the ethics committee pointed out that it was the 
guardian’s responsibility, not the attorney’s, to advocate for the client’s 
best interest.
149
 The opinion explained that: 
The disabled client has no one but his attorney to speak for him. 
Perhaps the client’s wishes do not carry the day before the finder 
of fact. Nevertheless, a disabled individual has the right to be 
heard through counsel. Counsel has a duty to zealously advocate 
on behalf of that individual.
150
 
According to the committee, the duty to advocate for the client’s 
expressed interests applies even when the attorney believes that the 
client’s position or proposed course of action is not in the client’s best 
interest.
151
 In such a case, the committee recommended that the attorney 
                                                     
146. For the opinions on point, see State Bar of N.D., Formal Op. 09-03 (2009); S.C. Bar, Formal 
Op. 05-11 (2005); Alaska Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 94-3 (1994); State Bar of Mich., Formal Op. CI-
919 (1984); N.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 16 (1999). The opinion with dicta is State Bar of Michigan, 
Formal Op. RI-213 (1994). 
147. Alaska Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 94-3, at 2. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 3–4. 
150. Id. at 4. 
151. Id. at 3. 
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carefully explain to the client the likely ramifications of the proposed 
course of action as clearly as possible.
152
 However, if the client could not 
be persuaded, it was the attorney’s duty to make the client’s wishes 
known to the court and zealously advocate for them on the client’s 
behalf.
153
 
The express interest approach was also applied by two bar 
associations in cases where a person subject to guardianship sought 
restoration of rights. The State Bar of Michigan took such an approach 
in a case in which an attorney sought restoration of rights on behalf of a 
client who had previously entered into a voluntary guardianship.
154
 
Similarly, a North Carolina Bar Association opinion considered an 
attorney’s role when representing a woman who had been found 
incompetent by a state agency and who sought to challenge that 
determination in court.
155
 The North Carolina Bar Association found that 
the attorney could ethically represent the woman using an expressed 
interest approach.
156
 However, it added a potential restrictive caveat, 
warning that if the attorney had reason to believe the client was in fact 
incompetent, filing an appeal could be frivolous and therefore violate 
Model Rule 3.1, which prohibits frivolous claims.
157
 
In addition, the expressed interest approach was applied by the South 
Carolina Bar in a case in which an attorney had represented the person 
subject to guardianship on an estate planning matter and sought to 
determine to whom to provide the legal file pertaining to that matter.
158
 
The Association found that the estate matter was outside the scope of the 
conservator’s powers and, therefore, the attorney was required to act in 
the same manner as an attorney representing any client with diminished 
capacity.
159
 Thus, the attorney was to follow the expressed interest 
model and only share the legal file or engage in other protective action 
                                                     
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 4. 
154. State Bar of Mich., Formal Op. CI-919 (1984). The opinion emphasized that the 
guardianship was voluntary and suggested that the lack of judicial determination of incapacity was 
relevant, but did not directly opine as to the result had the guardianship been the result of a 
contested proceeding. Id. 
155. N.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 16 (1999). 
156. Id. at 2 (“If Attorney A is able to maintain a relatively normal client-lawyer relationship with 
Wife [the client] and Attorney A reasonably believes that Wife is able to make adequately 
considered decisions in connection with her representation, Attorney A may continue to represent 
her alone without including the guardian in the representation.”). 
157. Id.  
158. S.C. Bar, Formal Op. 05-11, at 1 (2005). 
159. Id. at 2. 
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to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interest and then 
only if the attorney reasonably believed the client unable to act in her 
own interest in the matter.
160
 
In a somewhat more complex opinion, by contrast, the Ethics 
Committee of the State Bar Association of North Dakota applied a 
modified express interest approach to a situation in which a person under 
a full guardianship was represented by an attorney with regard to 
criminal charges.
161
 Although a district court had determined she was 
incapacitated, the defendant was deemed competent to stand trial.
162
 The 
guardian insisted that the defense attorney communicate with the 
guardian about the client’s case and allow the guardian to participate in 
decisions about pleadings and strategy.
163
 The person subject to 
guardianship expressly forbade her defense counsel to communicate 
with the guardian.
164
 In deciding that the attorney was required to 
communicate with the guardian, the committee stated that such 
communication with the guardian should be limited to what is 
“reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.”165 It cited 
paragraph c of North Dakota’s version of Model Rule 1.14 related to 
disclosure of confidential information when taking protective action.
166
 
The committee then referenced the state’s version of Comment 2 to 
Model Rule 1.14 (numbered as Comment 4 in the state rules), finding 
that the requesting attorney “must keep the client’s interests 
foremost
167
 . . . . [e]ven though the client has a guardian, the attorney 
should, as far as possible, accord the client the status of client, and 
particularly maintain communication with her in all matters pertaining to 
the representation.”168 
This approach taken by the State Bar Association of North Dakota 
can thus be seen as a variation on the expressed interest approach. The 
attorney is to maintain confidentiality and communication with the 
                                                     
160. Id. 
161. State Bar of N.D., Formal Op. 09-03, at 1 (2009). 
162. Id. at 6. 
163. Id. at 1. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 7 (quoting N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(c) (2002)). 
166. Id. at 2. 
167. Id. at 3. 
168. Id. at 8. The attorney also requested guidance about whom to look to for decision-making 
authority when the client and guardian were not in agreement. The committee found that this 
question raised significant due process and other constitutional issues and was therefore beyond its 
purview, and declined to issue an opinion. Id. 
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person subject to guardianship as with any other client. However, unlike 
a traditional attorney-client relationship in which the attorney is merely 
permitted under Model Rule 1.14 to disclose information to a third party 
in the name of reasonable protective action, here the attorney was 
deemed to be required to do so. Thus, the approach resembles the best 
interest model in that a paternalistic approach is required, but does not 
go so far as to require that the attorney act only in the client’s best 
interest. 
While the opinions directly on point thus all adopted either an express 
interest model or a variation thereon, dicta in an opinion of the State Bar 
of Michigan offers limited support for derivative representation as to 
matters delegated to the guardian. Specifically, in a 1994 opinion, the 
State Bar of Michigan considered the ethics of a law firm acting 
simultaneously as a guardian for an individual and as that individual’s 
counsel.
169
 It found that these dual roles were improper. In discussing the 
role of the attorney for a person subject to guardianship as part of its 
consideration, the State Bar of Michigan stated that the guardian should 
typically be “viewed as the primary client and the disabled person as the 
derivative client.”170 However, it recognized this is not the case “in 
circumstances where the guardian/conservator might be abusing the 
position.”171 
D. Court Opinions 
Whereas the few state ethics opinions directly on point support the 
expressed interest model of representation, court opinions addressing the 
role of attorneys when representing persons subject to guardianship are 
more diverse in their approaches. 
In cases where persons subject to guardianship sought representation 
related to powers that had been delegated to a guardian, and not for the 
purpose of challenging the existence, terms, or conditions of the 
guardianship, some courts have endorsed the derivative representation 
model. For example, in In re Guardianship of Hocker,
172
 a person 
subject to guardianship sought to retain the services of an attorney for 
purposes other than challenging the continuation of his guardianship or 
the fitness of the guardian.
173
 The attorney had represented Hocker 
                                                     
169. State Bar of Mich., Formal Op. RI-213 (1994). 
170. Id. at 3. 
171. Id. 
172. 791 N.E.2d 302 (Mass. 2003). 
173. The lower court had explicitly allowed that a person subject to guardianship could be 
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during the pendency of the guardianship petition.
174
 Once the guardian 
was appointed, the attorney sought to continue to represent her client in 
order to attend a meeting of the guardian, guardian’s attorney, and other 
family members.
175
 The attorney argued that Massachusetts’s version of 
Model Rule 1.14 imposed on her an affirmative duty to continue to 
represent her client after a guardian had been appointed.
176
 She focused 
on Comment 2, instructing an attorney whose client has a guardian or 
legal representative to “as far as possible accord the represented person 
the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication.”177 The 
court disagreed that the Rule contemplated the continuation of the 
relationship between the person subject to guardianship and his attorney 
who, as in this case, had been appointed by the court for the limited 
purpose of representing an alleged incapacitated person during the 
pendency of the guardianship petition.
178
 Absent a controversy between 
the person subject to guardianship and the guardian, the court found 
derivative representation to be the most appropriate model. The court 
emphasized Comment 3 to the state’s version of Model Rule 1.14, which 
advised, “[i]f a legal representative has already been appointed for the 
client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for 
decisions on behalf of the client.”179 Because the attorney must represent 
the person subject to guardianship through the guardian, and because the 
guardian did not choose to continue the attorney-client relationship, the 
representation was terminated.
180
 
The derivative representation model was also applied to 
representation unrelated to the guardianship proceedings in In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Kuhn.
181
 The court considered whether it 
was improper for an attorney to assist a client known to be under a 
guardianship to execute a will.
182
 The attorney met privately with the 
client (who he had represented prior to the guardianship), drafted a new 
will at the client’s request, and helped the client execute it without 
                                                     
represented by counsel for these purposes. Id. at 306. 
174. Id. at 304. 
175. Id. at 304 n.2. 
176. Id. at 309. 
177. Id. (quoting MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 2 (1998)). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 309–10. Comment 3 is similar to Comment 4 of Model Rule 1.14. See id. at 310 n.20. 
180. Id. at 308–09. 
181. 785 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 2010). 
182. Id. at 198. 
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communicating with the guardian.
183
 The will was subsequently found to 
be invalid.
184
 The court held that the attorney had violated his ethical 
duties when he gave advice and provided legal services to a person 
subject to guardianship without informing or consulting the guardian.
185
 
Like Hocker, competing arguments were made emphasizing different 
comments to Model Rule 1.14.
186
 The court focused on Comment 5 of 
North Dakota’s version of Model Rule 1.14, which stated in pertinent 
part, “[i]f the client has an appointed representative, the lawyer should 
ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the 
client.”187 The court rejected the attorney’s claim that he was giving his 
client attention and respect as directed by Comment 3,
188
 which 
instructed, “[e]ven if the person has an appointed representative, the 
lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status 
of client, particularly in maintaining communication.”189 
By contrast, the best interest model was applied in In re Clark,
190
 in 
which an attorney who had been representing a person subject to 
guardianship acted contrary to the client’s express wishes. In this case, 
the client, Janet Clark, was placed under a guardianship after suffering a 
head injury in a motor vehicle accident.
191
 An attorney, A. Frank Johns, 
was hired
192
 to represent Clark with regard to guardianship and trust 
matters that were expected to arise once Clark’s personal injury suit was 
resolved.
193
 Nearly two years after the attorney began representing 
Clark, a petition to terminate the guardianship was filed by Clark’s 
husband.
194
 Johns, still acting as Clark’s attorney, opposed the 
                                                     
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 197–98. 
185. Id. at 202. 
186. Id. at 200–02. 
187. Id. at 200 (quoting N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2006)). This language is nearly 
identical to language in Comment 4 of Model Rule 1.14.  
188. Id. at 200–02. 
189. Id. at 201–02 (quoting N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 3). This language is materially 
identical to language in Comment 2 of Model Rule 1.14. 
190. 688 S.E.2d 484 (N.C. 2010). 
191. Id. at 485. 
192. The attorney was hired by Clark’s sister. Although Clark’s sister eventually became her 
guardian, Johns was hired before Clark’s sister was officially appointed. Id. at 486. Other attorneys 
from Johns’ firm also provided legal services to Clark and are sometimes mentioned by the court. 
For the sake of simplicity, our rendition of the facts includes Johns only. 
193. Id. at 486. 
194. Id.  
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petition.
195
 A few weeks later, Clark submitted a letter to the court 
asking that a hearing be held to determine if she could be restored to 
capacity.
196
 She also expressed a preference that her husband, rather than 
her sister, serve as her guardian if one were still required and that she 
wished to be represented by her husband’s attorney rather than by 
Johns.
197
 Less than a week later, the court approved a $4 million 
settlement in Clark’s personal injury case.198 Around this time Clark was 
involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital after becoming 
hysterical in her guardian’s car.199 In light of these facts, the trial court 
refused to remove Johns as Clark’s attorney.200 After a second petition 
seeking to remove the current guardian was filed by Clark’s husband, the 
guardian hired her own attorney to represent her in her fiduciary role.
201
 
The parties entered into a settlement in which an irrevocable trust was 
established, and Clark was restored to capacity.
202
 Johns then filed 
several motions seeking the approval of his firm’s attorney fees,203 to 
which Clark objected on the grounds that it was unfair to charge her for 
services she had not wanted and that furthered a position contrary to her 
own.
204
 
In affirming the lower court’s decision approving the payment of 
attorney fees, the appellate court characterized the attorney’s duty as 
promoting the client’s best interest: 
[T]here is no question but that Ms. Clark wanted her 
competency restored, objected to Mr. Johns’ actions to the 
extent that they obstructed her attempts to obtain that goal, and 
wanted him relieved as her attorney. However, the trial court 
found as a fact that Mr. Johns genuinely believed that Mr. Clark 
was attempting to obtain control over Ms. Clark’s personal 
injury settlement for his own purposes and that it would not be 
in Ms. Clark’s best interests for her competency to be 
restored. . . . As long as Ms. Clark’s competency had not been 
restored, Mr. Johns had a duty to exercise his best judgment on 
                                                     
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 487. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 488. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 488–89. 
203. Id. at 491–93. 
204. Id. at 493. 
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behalf of his client . . . .
205
 
Thus, in this situation, the court approved of a best interest model of 
representation. 
In cases in which an attorney has been retained by a person subject to 
guardianship explicitly for the purpose of challenging a guardianship or 
its terms or conditions, by comparison, courts generally appear to 
embrace the expressed interest model of representation. For example, the 
expressed interest model was adopted in In re M.R.,
206
 a case involving a 
young adult with a developmental disability. The person subject to 
guardianship and her father petitioned the court to allow her to move 
into her father’s home, contrary to the wishes of her mother who served 
as her guardian.
207
 The attorney representing the person subject to 
guardianship asked the court to clarify whether his role was to advocate 
for his client’s expressed preferences or to act based on his own 
perceptions of what was in her best interest.
208
 In deciding that the role 
of the attorney was to advocate for the client’s preferences, the court 
distinguished the role of an attorney from that of a guardian ad litem 
(GAL).
209
 According to the court, it is the GAL’s responsibility to 
evaluate what is in the best interest of the person subject to guardianship, 
even if this contradicts the expressed wishes of the represented person.
210
 
The attorney for the person subject to guardianship, on the other hand, 
should not “dilut[e]” the representation with “excessive concern for the 
client’s best interests.”211 The court cautioned, however, that an attorney 
for a person subject to guardianship should not advocate for decisions 
that are “patently absurd or that pose an undue risk of harm to the 
                                                     
205. Id. at 497–98. 
206. 638 A.2d 1274 (N.J. 1994). 
207. Id. at 1276. 
208. Id. at 1282. 
209. Id. at 1283. 
210. Id. at 1284. 
211. Id. at 1285. A similar description of the roles of the GAL and attorney for the person subject 
to guardianship is provided in In re Guardianship of Jennifer M., 779 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2009), in which a woman subject to a limited guardianship sought to have counsel present during an 
interview with her GAL. See id. at 437. In considering whether she was entitled to the presence of 
counsel, the court observed that under state law it was possible for a person subject to guardianship 
to be represented by both a GAL and an “adversary attorney,” and that the roles of these two types 
of representatives were different. Id. at 439. According to the court, the GAL is an advocate for the 
person’s best interests who, although required to take the person’s preferences into account, is not 
bound by those wishes. Id. (quoting Knight v. Milwaukee Cty., 640 N.W.2d 773, 784 (Wis. 2002)). 
By comparison, in accord with state statute, the adversary attorney must maintain a normal attorney-
client relationship and advocate for the expressed interests of the person subject to guardianship. Id. 
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client.”212 
Finally, a more complex, modified expressed interest approach was 
also adopted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the context of a 
person who objected to the continuation of his conservatorship.
213
 The 
court in Gross v. Rell
214
 addressed what an attorney should do when 
faced with conflicting instructions from the client and the guardian. 
After a petition was filed alleging that Daniel Gross was legally 
incapacitated, Gross informed his court-appointed attorney that he 
opposed being placed under conservatorship.
215
 However, his attorney 
failed to object to the appointment of a conservator, finding no grounds 
upon which to contest the petition despite his client being, by his own 
account, intelligent and alert.
216
 The attorney continued representing 
Gross after the guardian was appointed.
217
 Gross was placed in a locked 
ward of a nursing home where he was assaulted by his roommate.
218
 By 
filing a writ of habeas corpus (apparently without the assistance of his 
court-appointed attorney), Gross was eventually able to demonstrate 
numerous procedural and due process violations, resulting in an order 
freeing him from the nursing home and terminating the 
conservatorship.
219
 Following his release, Gross sued his court-appointed 
attorney, among others, for violations of his due process rights, 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and legal 
malpractice.
220
 In rejecting the attorney’s claim of quasi-judicial 
                                                     
212. In re M.R., 638 A.2d at 1285. In remanding the case, the court stated, “[h]er attorney’s role 
should be to advocate for her choice, as long as it does not pose unreasonable risks for her health, 
safety, and welfare.” Id. at 1286. Noting that the state’s ethics rules were inadequate and in need of 
reform, the court offered some guidelines until amendment to the rules could be achieved:  
The primary duty of the attorney for [a developmentally disabled] person is to protect that 
person’s rights, including the right to make decisions on specific matters. Generally, the 
attorney should advocate any decision made by the developmentally-disabled person. On 
perceiving a conflict between the person’s preferences and best interests, the attorney may 
inform the court of the possible need for a guardian ad litem.  
Id. at 1285 (emphasis in original). 
213. In Connecticut, adult guardianship of the person, the property, or both is called 
conservatorship. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-644 (West, Westlaw through 2016). 
214. 40 A.3d 240 (Conn. 2012). 
215. Id. at 246.  
216. Id. at 246–47. Later, a superior court judge said that the adversary attorney’s failure to find a 
basis upon which to challenge the conservatorship “completely blows my mind.” Id. 
217. Id. at 247. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 248. When Gross returned home, he found the house “ransacked.” Id. According to the 
court, he lived there independently until his death. Id. 
220. Id. at 248 n.4. 
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immunity,
221
 the court grappled with the issue of the proper role of a 
lawyer representing a client subject to a conservatorship. First, the court 
recognized that the primary function of an attorney representing a person 
under a conservatorship is to advocate for the client’s expressed 
wishes.
222
 However, the court granted a significant amount of discretion 
to the attorney to determine whether to be guided by the client or 
conservator. If the lawyer and the conservator both agreed that the 
client’s preferences were unreasonable, the attorney could follow the 
conservator’s directions.223 Otherwise, “the attorney may advocate for 
those [the client’s] wishes and is not bound by the conservator’s 
decision.”224 The best interest standard, the court continued, was only 
appropriate in exceptional cases.
225
 Thus, Gross represents a modified 
express interest approach akin to that in the North Dakota bar opinion 
discussed in the preceding Section.
226
 
In short, what model of representation courts condone appears to 
depend in large part on the purpose of the underlying representation. 
Consistent with this pattern, in In re Estate of Kutchins,
227
 an Illinois 
court endorsed two different models in a single case—one for 
representing the person in challenging the guardianship and another for 
representing the same person seeking to perform a task that had been 
delegated to the guardian. Lawrence Kutchins hired a law firm to 
represent him to oppose his guardian’s efforts to sell certain stocks in his 
estate and to petition for restoration of capacity.
228
 When the firm 
subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees, the court granted the 
request for fees related to the representation in the capacity restoration 
matter, but denied the fees connected with the appellate work involving 
the stock sale because the firm had not obtained the court’s or the 
guardian’s permission prior to filing the appeal.229 Thus, the court 
condoned the representation only insofar as it related to the terms and 
                                                     
221. Newman, the attorney, claimed that he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because his 
primary role was to assist the court to determine and serve the best interests of his client. Id. at 257. 
222. Id. at 260. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. (“Thus, as a general rule, attorneys for respondents and attorneys for conservatees are not 
ethically permitted, much less required, to make decisions on the basis of their personal judgment 
regarding a respondent’s or a conservatee’s best interests, although they may be required to do so in 
an exceptional case.”). 
225. Id.  
226. See supra Section III.C. 
227. 523 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
228. Id. at 1026. 
229. Id. at 1027–28. 
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conditions of the guardianship itself.
230
 
IV. A PROPOSED ETHICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
CLARIFICATION 
So what is an attorney to do? In this Part, we provide a synthesis of 
the underlying law and available ethical guidance and distill it into a 
simple ethical framework to guide attorneys who are representing, or 
considering accepting representation of, persons subject to guardianship. 
We then show how a simple clarification to Model Rule 1.14 could 
provide much-needed guidance for attorneys in such situations. 
A. A Framework for Determining the Appropriate Model of 
Representation 
Our review of the underlying law and the current ethical guidance 
available to attorneys in the preceding two Parts indicates that attorneys 
may legally and ethically represent and take direction from persons 
subject to guardianship in certain situations, but not in others. 
Specifically, based on the research presented in Parts II and III of this 
Article, we conclude that attorneys legally may, and ethically should, 
adopt an expressed interest (or “normal relationship”) model of 
representation when representing persons subject to guardianship who 
seek to challenge the existence, terms, or conditions of their 
guardianship, or who seek legal advice about their rights in this regard. 
The expressed interest approach is also appropriate when a person 
subject to guardianship seeks legal assistance to exercise other retained 
rights. By contrast, where such persons seek legal representation to 
undertake a legal act that has been lawfully delegated to the guardian, an 
attorney may not legally or ethically directly represent them in the 
matter. In any case, the best interest standard should only be applied 
when the client is at risk of substantial harm, justifying reasonable 
protective action consistent with Model Rule 1.14. 
Thus, we suggest that the ethical framework for attorneys 
representing persons subject to guardianship can be distilled in the 
following manner: 
                                                     
230. Id. 
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As depicted in Figure 1, we differentiate between three situations in 
which an attorney would be called upon to represent a person subject to 
guardianship: (1) situations in which the representation is related to a 
guardianship matter (e.g., the existence, terms, or conditions of the 
guardianship); (2) situations in which the representation is related to 
other retained rights; and (3) situations involving representation related 
to matters that are related neither to retained rights nor to the 
guardianship. 
In the first situation, an expressed interest model of representation 
with only limited exceptions is necessary to protect the fundamental due 
process rights of persons subject to guardianship. If such persons are not 
able to engage counsel and direct the attorney to act according to their 
wishes, as a practical matter they will effectively be denied the ability to 
protect their fundamental constitutional rights. Therefore, the default 
ethical standard for an attorney representing a person subject to 
guardianship in a matter related to the guardianship should be to 
maintain a normal attorney-client relationship. As described earlier, a 
normal attorney-client relationship entails keeping client 
communications confidential, making sure a client stays reasonably 
informed about the status of the legal matter, providing competent legal 
advice and services, complying with the client’s directions regarding the 
objectives of the representation (unless the client’s expressed wishes are 
Figure 1: Ethical Framework for Representing Clients Subject to 
Guardianship 
Is the representation 
related to the 
guardianship? 
Situation 1: Is the 
client at risk of 
substantial harm? 
Reasonably 
necessary protective 
action permitted 
Normal attorney-
client relationship 
Is the client seeking 
to exercise a retained 
right? 
Situation 2: Is the 
client at risk of 
substantial harm? 
Reasonably 
necessary protective 
action permitted 
Normal attorney-
client relationship 
Situation 3: 
Derivative 
representation 
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patently frivolous or unlawful), and consulting with the client regarding 
the means of achieve those objectives.
231
 As with persons not subject to 
guardianship, an attorney would be permitted to deviate from a normal 
attorney-client relationship to take protective action when, as set forth in 
Model Rule 1.14, “the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has 
diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other 
harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client’s own 
interest.”232 
In the second situation, the representation is unrelated to the 
guardianship and the primary question is whether the matter pertains to a 
retained right. To prevent excessive infringement on an individual’s 
fundamental rights, guardianship must be no more restrictive than is 
necessary. The person subject to guardianship should be free to exercise 
all of the person’s rights that have not been delegated to the guardian or 
otherwise restricted by the guardianship order. The expressed interest 
model is able to empower clients to fully and meaningfully exercise their 
retained rights. Once again, however, the lawyer may deviate from the 
normal attorney-client relationship under the same circumstances that 
the lawyer would be free to deviate if the client were not subject to 
guardianship. For example, the lawyer could be entitled to take 
protective action if assisting a client who has diminished capacity to 
exercise a retained right is reasonably likely to place that person at 
substantial risk of harm. 
In the third situation, by contrast, it is unethical for an attorney to help 
a client to directly exercise a right that has been lawfully delegated to the 
guardian. Assisting a client to take an action that he or she does not have 
the legal capacity to do could violate Model Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits 
an attorney from counseling or assisting a client in fraudulent or criminal 
conduct.
233
 In addition, it might be construed as a violation of Model 
Rule 3.1, which prohibits an attorney from bringing a claim for which 
there is no legal basis.
234
 In such cases, the attorney can assist the client 
to exercise the right through the guardian, consistent with the derivative 
representation model.
235
 
In short, maintaining a normal attorney-client relationship is the 
appropriate model of representation in most situations and can, 
                                                     
231. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
233. See id. r. 1.2(d); Lee, supra note 13, at 476. 
234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1. 
235. Alternatively, the attorney could represent the person subject to guardianship in seeking 
restoration of that right through an amendment to the underlying guardianship order. 
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therefore, be classified as the default ethical standard. Considering the 
client’s best interest is only appropriate when maintaining the normal 
relationship would put the client at risk of substantial harm. Derivative 
representation is only appropriate as to matters unrelated to the 
guardianship itself and only when those matters have been delegated to 
the guardian.
236
 
This proposed framework is consistent with the requirements of due 
process. As discussed in Section II.C of this Article, what due process 
requires depends on whether the legal matter is related to the 
guardianship or not. In matters related to the guardianship, due process 
requires that the decision-making processes and proceedings allow 
sufficiently meaningful participation so as to be fair to the person subject 
to guardianship. In matters unrelated to the guardianship, the primary 
due process concern is less about fairness of the proceedings and more 
about the opportunity to meaningfully exercise retained rights. Because 
these due process considerations differ, our framework distinguishes 
between representations related to the guardianship and those related to 
other legal matters. 
In addition, the framework is consistent with the underlying purpose 
of guardianship.
237
 By acknowledging the expressed interest model is 
not appropriate where the person subject to guardianship seeks 
representation to perform an act that has been delegated to the guardian, 
the framework allows guardianship to continue to protect at risk, 
vulnerable persons by delegating decision-making authority to third 
parties as necessary. 
B. A Proposal for Implementing the Framework Through Model Rule 
1.14 
Because Model Rule 1.14 has been adopted either as is or with minor 
modifications by almost all states,
238
 we focus our final analysis and 
recommendations for reform on this Rule and its commentary. To the 
extent our analysis and recommendations apply to other sources of 
                                                     
236. Even in such situations, however, the attorney may have limited duties to the person subject 
to guardianship. See Lee, supra note 13, at 475–79. 
237. This is critical not only because both due process and protecting the underlying purpose of 
guardianship are valuable from a public policy perspective. It is also critical because, although the 
relevant cases, ethics opinions, and secondary sources may appear divergent and often 
contradictory, there are some consistent overarching themes. These include concern for due process, 
the need to protect vulnerable people from harm, and the delegation of authority to the guardian. It 
is around these three themes that the proposed framework is structured. 
238. See supra note 121. 
09 - Kohn & Koss.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2016  7:06 PM 
634 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:581 
 
ethical guidance, we hope they will inform future amendments to those 
materials as well. 
Incorporating our framework into existing ethical guidelines will not 
require changing the main text of even a single Model Rule. The main 
text of Model Rule 1.14 is consistent with the framework proposed in 
this Article. Paragraph a of the Rule instructs an attorney to maintain a 
normal attorney-client relationship even when a client has diminished 
capacity.
239
 Paragraph b describes an exception to this general rule when 
a client is at risk of substantial harm and is unable to act in his or her 
own interests.
240
 An attorney is then permitted to take reasonably 
necessary protective action. This narrow exception acknowledges that 
under some circumstances a person’s diminished capacity may pose 
such a threat to that person’s security that protective action is justified, 
whether or not there is a guardian appointed. The Rule thus strikes the 
appropriate balance between respecting autonomy and protecting a 
vulnerable person from substantial harm.
241
 
Consistent with the main text of Model Rule 1.14, our proposed 
framework would have the attorney maintain a normal attorney-client 
relationship with persons subject to guardianship. This means that the 
attorney would advocate for the person’s expressed interests except in 
circumstances where the person seeks legal representation to perform an 
act that has been delegated to the guardian. Thus, as with other clients, 
the representation would be limited by what the client is legally 
authorized to do. The proposed framework permits an attorney to take 
protective action in the circumstances described in Model Rule 
1.14(b).
242
 Notably, however, since protective action has already been 
taken in the form of the guardianship itself, situations that warrant 
additional protective steps by the attorney may be less common than 
when a client is not subject to a guardianship. 
By contrast, revisions to the Comments to Model Rule 1.14 are 
necessary. As set forth in Part III of this Article, the current Comments 
to Model Rule 1.14 are internally inconsistent and confusing. 
Throughout the cases and ethics opinions discussed in this Article are 
examples of selective application of Comments 2 and 4. At times the 
decision-makers rely on Comment 2 to hold attorneys to the expressed 
                                                     
239. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(a). 
240. Id. r. 1.14(b). 
241. Likewise, paragraph c of Model Rule 1.14, which simply states the general rule that a client 
with diminished capacity continues to be entitled to confidentiality, is consistent with the proposed 
framework. 
242. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(b). 
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interest standard, while at other times attorneys are held to the derivative 
representation standard based on Comment 4. The co-existence of these 
comments creates at best an ambiguous rule and at worst a trap for 
attorneys representing clients subject to guardianship. 
We propose that both Comment 2 and Comment 4 be replaced in 
favor of a unified comment that explicitly addresses representation of 
persons subject to guardianship. This new comment should clarify that 
being subject to a guardianship does not prevent a person from being 
represented by an attorney. It should also make clear that Model Rule 
1.14 applies to all clients with diminished capacity, whether or not a 
guardian has been appointed. This means that attorneys representing 
persons subject to guardianship should maintain a normal attorney-client 
relationship in most cases. Finally, it should outline the exceptional 
situations in which maintaining a normal relationship is inappropriate, 
including when doing so would put the client at risk of substantial harm 
and when the legal matter has been lawfully delegated to the guardian. 
To aid the process of revising the comments to Model Rule 1.14, we 
provide the following suggested language that could be considered for 
adoption: 
 The requirements of the Rule apply to clients with diminished 
capacity regardless of whether or not a guardian, conservator, or 
other agent has been appointed to act on the client’s behalf. 
Even if the person has a legal representative, the lawyer should 
as far as possible accord the represented person the status of 
client, particularly in maintaining communication. 
 When representing a client subject to guardianship or 
conservatorship in a matter related to the guardianship or 
conservatorship (including but not limited to proceedings to 
modify the terms of the appointment or to restore the client’s 
rights), an attorney should maintain a normal attorney-client 
relationship with the client unless the attorney reasonably 
believes that doing so would place the client at risk of 
substantial physical, financial, or other harm, and the client 
cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest. In such case, 
the attorney may take reasonably necessary protective action 
consistent with sections (b) and (c) of the Rule. This reasonable 
protective action may include recommending to the court the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem. 
 Before representing a client subject to guardianship or 
conservatorship in a matter not directly related to the terms or 
conditions of the guardianship or conservatorship, an attorney 
should make a reasonable effort to determine whether the client 
retains the right to carry out the proposed act. If the attorney 
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reasonably concludes that the client retains the right to carry out 
the act, the attorney should maintain a normal attorney-client 
relationship unless the attorney reasonably believes that doing so 
would place the client at risk of substantial physical, financial, 
or other harm. In such case, the client may take reasonably 
necessary protective action consistent with sections (b) and (c) 
of the Rule. If the attorney reasonably concludes that the act has 
been lawfully delegated to the guardian or conservator, or is 
otherwise impermissible, an attorney may not directly represent 
the client in the matter. Instead, the attorney should inform the 
client of the restriction on the client’s rights and, at the client’s 
request, may petition the court to allow the client to carry out the 
desired act. Any such petitions are subject to Rule 3.1 regarding 
frivolous claims. 
 If the lawyer represents the guardian or conservator as 
distinct from the person, and is aware that the guardian is acting 
adversely to the person’s interest, the lawyer may have an 
obligation to prevent or rectify the misconduct of the guardian or 
conservator. 
CONCLUSION 
Persons subject to guardianship must be able to engage attorneys to 
represent them in challenging the terms, conditions, and existence of 
their guardianships if their fundamental due process rights are to be 
respected. They must also be able to access legal representation to 
exercise other retained rights. While some lawyers are reasonably 
concerned that representing such individuals will expose them to 
potential liability, it is ethical and appropriate for attorneys to enter into 
a normal attorney-client relationship with persons subject to 
guardianship to represent them as to matters related to the guardianship 
and with regard to other retained rights. 
Nevertheless, unless the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are 
clarified, risk-averse attorneys are likely to continue to shun 
representation of persons subject to guardianship for fear of jeopardizing 
their licenses to practice. Adopting the simple change to the Comments 
to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14 could substantially increase 
clarity with regard to the attorney’s role, and thereby encourage 
attorneys to undertake the representations necessary to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of persons subject to guardianship—some of the 
most vulnerable members of society—are truly respected and protected. 
 
